

PB 34-90-2

April - June 1990



# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



HOW TO SUCCEED AT THE NTC

SNIPERS AS SCOUTS

THE MI OF THE FUTURE



# MILITARY INTELLIGENCE


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By Order of the  
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
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# VANTAGE POINT

**Major General  
Paul E. Menoher, Jr.**

The Combat Training Centers (CTCs), such as the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTc), as well as the Battle Commanders' Training Program (BCTP) provide excellent training opportunities for our MI battalions and G2 staffs. The lessons learned at the CTCs help develop Doctrine, Training, Organization, Material and Leadership (DTOML). In the last issue of MI Professional Bulletin, I discussed the critical role of the S2. Lessons learned from the CTCs were a major factor behind the increased prominence of the S2. For the rest of this article I'd like to emphasize the importance of training at the CTCs.

The MI battalion's mission is to support the division, however, training opportunities to deploy the entire division or MI battalion are limited. These opportunities often do not provide the tough and realistic training needed to evaluate the intelligence system and unit performance. It has long been recognized that the CTCs provide the best environment for tough realistic training against a dedicated OPFOR. This environment challenges our soldiers, our logistic system and unit performance. This quality training identifies our strengths and weaknesses, and helps us to improve our support to all elements. We must take advantage of each opportunity to provide our MI battalions with quality training challenges. The CTCs offer that challenge.

The skeptic will say that the training environment at the CTC is not perfect; that the intercepts and communications are only in English; that there is a small target spectrum with limited emitters; that there is a lack of counterintelligence and interrogation; and that little or no host-nation support exists. However, the CTCs do provide a realistic OPFOR with MILES, a highly motivated MI company team (OPFOR), and an aggressive reconnaissance company. They provide the MI battalion a chance to perform all "fieldcraft" to include land navigation, camouflage set up, wire laying and survival. This training is based on a realistic scenario that will cause the commander and staff to plan, coordinate, and synchronize. To further counter the skeptics, the Intelligence Center and School is working to cre-

ate a realistic electronic spectrum in the target language; computer simulation that portrays OPFOR rear, adjacent and follow-on forces; and improved counterintelligence and interrogation play. In short, CTCs provide the best training environment for the MI battalion — and it's getting better.

The Intelligence Center and School is vitally interested in the CTCs as a place where we can evaluate our DTOML. Since taking command in September, I've been to the NTC twice and observed JRTC rotations both here at Fort Huachuca and Fort Chaffee. Recently, full-up MI battalions have deployed to the NTC. Observing our soldiers during these rotations helps me fix DTOML here at the Intelligence Center and School.

I need your help. The budget is getting tight and I can't afford to attend all the rotations. As the ultimate user of my DTOML products you can assist me in identifying ways we can do things smarter and more cost effectively. An example would be: How can the MI brigade, battalion or company team best support the integration of heavy-light and light-heavy forces during CTC rotations? Remember, some problems and solutions are unique to your unit, and doctrine is Army-wide. But, you should disseminate what you've learned because that is the name of our business. Within my Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, I have a CTC action office. Send your ideas, solutions and lessons learned to them at the following address: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-ES, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7000. I need to hear what you have to say. Lessons learned from the CTCs are already impacting our DTOML, they include the criticality of the S2, reconnaissance and surveillance planning, and the synchronization of combat power.

The greatest lesson from the training centers is that without accurate, timely intelligence we cannot hope to win on the next battlefield. Together, we in the Military Intelligence Corps can find a better way to provide the Army with accurate and timely intelligence. I challenge you to utilize the CTCs and find the solutions that can help us stay **ALWAYS OUT FRONT.**



## Command Sergeant Major David P. Klehn

I read all the end of course critiques that ANCOC and BNCOC students fill out at both Fort Huachuca and Fort Devens. In many of these I have seen comments from students who don't understand why some things are done at the two NCO Academies. Let me cover some of the reasons why we do things the way we do.

Before I do that I want to say that a lot of the complaints I read in the critiques are justified. We will work to correct those that fall under our control.

In TRADOC Regulation 350-24, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) establishes responsibilities, training policies and guidance for developing and conducting NCO Education System (NCOES) Training in our NCO Academies.

Some NCOs believe that NCOES courses are supposed to be purely technical. The objective of NCOES training is to train NCOs to be competent to lead, train and fight. NCOES course design requires BNCOC and ANCOC students to demonstrate essential leader, trainer, technical and tactical competencies as squad/section leaders or platoon sergeants in order to graduate.

As you know, the battlefield will not be like those in previous wars. We will see the enemy deep in our rear areas. This means that the soldier, whether Combat Arms, Combat Support or Combat Service Support, will more than ever need to know and perform individual and collective tasks. Common leader combat skills must become a fundamental part of training at all skill levels.

NCOES training must be conducted in a challenging, live-in, leadership intensive NCO Academy (NCOA) environment. This is to reinforce students' professional standards through total immersion in an environment that replicates the unit. NCOA cadre must teach and demonstrate the standards of leadership, training, technical and tactical competence, and overall professionalism that should be maintained by the NCO Corps throughout the Army. NCOA standards will be Army standards. NCOA standards will be the realistic standards NCOs must demonstrate and enforce in their own units. If we are ever in doubt as to whether a standard is appropriate, we

should ask ourselves if it is one we would enforce in our unit as a platoon sergeant or first sergeant. If not, then it is a safe bet that NCOA cadre and especially students will find the standard inappropriate for the development of NCOs.

The key to an effective "NCOA environment" is the constructive use of the students' time both in and out of the classroom. If classes are completed early for the day, why not let the student leaders, under the guidance of the cadre, adjust their physical training (PT) time, formation time, etc. rather than wait until the previously prescribed time? NCOA cadre should not fill the time with "make-do" work such as police call or raking leaves.

Leadership principles and professional skills must be reinforced as part of the students' daily routine. Training should not start and end with the first and last academic class of the day. Instead, students should be placed in a challenging, performance-oriented leadership environment throughout the day. Student leaders should plan, supervise and perform NCOA-related activities as they would in their units. In addition to student requirements outlined in POIs for academic training, students should prepare for and conduct inspections, physical training and remedial/additional training for fellow students. Student leaders should reinforce their drill and ceremonies by marching their groups to and from class when practical. The cadre, the small group leaders (SGLs), should be mentors, counselors and role models during and after the normal academic day. SGLs should control the students' entire duty day, either personally or through student leaders, from first call to lights out. NCOAs should not use demerit systems, harassment or other similar techniques. As role models, cadre must treat students as they would treat NCO subordinates in units. Student inspections must be student-led and used to teach how and why to inspect.

SGLs should conduct the initial PT session, participate in PT with their small group, and be responsible for ensuring that students conduct a quality PT program based on the Master Fitness Program. Students should plan and lead PT on a

(Continued on page 7)

# FROM THE EDITOR

One "lesson learned" that repeatedly surfaces in after actions at our combat training centers is that **accurate, timely intelligence wins battles**. Why this should be a surprise to anyone escapes me. Why it becomes so dramatically apparent at the NTC, JRTC and CMTC does not.


Our training centers give our maneuver units a rare opportunity to fight an aggressive, well-trained, mobile, lethal and unpredictable enemy. In short, "**real bad guys**." It's a bitter lesson to learn that the "good guys" don't always win.


Our combat centers teach us in a way that no amount of scenario-playing in the backyard can, that the commander who can outthink, outmaneuver and outfight his opponent will win — "good guy" or not.

Let me direct your attention to this year's writer of the year award on page 11. I'm pleased to tell you that making a selection this year was tough. There were **several** really fine pieces of writing this year — one more tribute to our branch of **thinking soldiers**.

MI soldiers are the source for the "outthink" part of the victory equation. I am delighted this issue, right on the heels of last quarter's S2 issue, can address some of the ins and outs of MI soldiers at the CTCs.

We are hard at work on the July issue which will focus on Low Intensity Conflict. Deadline for that issue is April 15th. I think October's bulletin will talk about MI Aviators. Interested?

  
John Vance, editor



# LETTERS

Dear Editor:

In an after action report from the 1987 G2/MI Commander's Conference, I found the comments of Work Group 4, "Peacetime Utilization of Tactical CI Assets" provocative. Here are my unsolicited suggestions for peacetime utilization of CI assets.

I have worked the tactical CI issue since 1977 and have concluded that peacetime tactical CI is a myth. If it took 11 years to reach the conclusion that prioritization of the peacetime CI mission against the demonstrated hostile intelligence services (HOIS) threat is too vague for comment, then I submit we have not made much progress.

I propose the Army remove most 97B, 971A and 35E positions from echelons below corps, perhaps leaving one or two positions at the general staff level. The eliminated positions should be transferred to INSCOM. CI agents would then be organized (CAP-STONED if you will) around geographic/linguistic considerations. For instance, a five-man agent team might have targeted Grenada. When the 82d Airborne Division was alerted for Grenada, the agent team would have been transferred OPCON to the commander, 82d Airborne. The CI expertise available to the 82d would have been both target and language specific with fully developed black, white and grey lists and current demonstrated HOIS data. The current system of make-it-up-as-you-go-along CI is not only tactically unsound, but a source of low morale among CI agents. The problem, in summation, is that the CI agents are **unit** specific, where-

as they should be **mission** specific.

Belonging to the CI community is an honor and a privilege. Officers selected for 35E must specialize and not become wrapped up in the multidisciplined jack of all trades, master of none game. The nation can ill afford a dilettante CI officer corps. An unfortunate side effect would be that CI officers would enjoy the same promotion opportunities of their Great Skills counterparts; which is to say limited, and forget about general officer. Since most CI officers are volunteers and seem to be more in love with the work than the rank, I see this as a limited shortcoming. In fact, the corporate body of the U.S. Army would have a harder time living with this fact than the officers affected.

It may be desirable to set the clock back 15 or 20 years and return to a modified "stove pipe." A separate CI command organized along the lines of CID under INSCOM would be ideal. This would eliminate the current situation of tactical commanders not knowing how to properly use their CI assets and at the same time refusing to let anyone else do it for them. The increased efficiencies of a unitized CI command should rationally allow for a reduction in force. Given the reality of today's defense budget we can ill afford to not consider all options.

The question, "Do tactical commanders need tactical CI support?" has been answered in the affirmative. Unfortunately an underlying assumption was made that they need this support during peacetime. The real question should have been: "When do tactical commanders need tactical CI support?" The

answer is to OPCON tactical CI assets upon alert. We can validate this capability in peacetime through agent support of Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises and major FTXs. Depending on the contingency being exercised the tactical commander would receive an agent team tailored to the mission.

Thank you for your attention to this matter. As a major, I am not under the illusion that I am in any position to change Army doctrine. However, the after action report moved me to lend my voice to a subject that I feel has stagnated for too long. All my best and may the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School remain "Always Out Front."

Major John E. Birch, Jr.

140th Military Intelligence Battalion

Dear Editor:

I would like to take issue with the letter to the editor written by Rand Dee Bowerman and published in the October-December 1989 issue of *Military Intelligence*. "Randy" obviously is either seriously misinformed or has made some very bad assumptions about the AN/TSQ-164 DRAGONFIX system. He specifically takes issue with four "slighted" areas. Had he done his homework, he would have discovered:

1) The Force Structure folks from FORSCOM, DA AND the Intelligence Center and School have been fighting this battle since program inception. The bottom line was the corps commander was willing to take assets "out-of-hide" to obtain this capability.

2) Over \$2M was spent up-front to ensure that all the

ILS issues would be met. An ILSP was created, along with all the other required documents (MAC, GSERD, BOIP, QQPRI, RPSTL, Tech manuals (-12, -14, -23P), O&O Plan, NET plan, etc.) The system was set up under a three-level maintenance concept with transition to full "green-suit" maintenance within two years. CECOM assigned a life cycle support project team to help manage the "ilities," and depot support for the system will come from Tobyhanna.

3) A System MANPRINT Management Plan (SMMP) was drawn up early on with the help of the Intelligence and Security Board (INSBD) there at Fort Huachuca and from Fort Devens. INSBD also performed the systems RAM analysis.

4) As for doctrine, if the RECS program hadn't been so badly mismanaged there would never have been a need for this system. Lessons learned from the field all point to the critical need for this type of system. There is no guarantee that the EAC MI brigades will be responsive enough to the needs of the tactical commander, especially the flexibility requirements of the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander. DRAGON-FIX was specifically designed to meet those needs.

Lastly, Bowerman's disparaging remarks about the "wonderful" off-the-shelf systems that are permanently deadlined due to lack of spare parts appears to be a deliberate attempt to denigrate the yeoman efforts of the FORSCOM NDI Program, parent of such success stories as MICROFIX (AN/UYK-71), GOLDWING (AN/GRQ-27), TACFIX (AN/TRQ-37), MINIFIX (AN-

PRD-11), RACJAM (AN/ULQ-19 V(2)), HACJ (AN/ULQ-19 V(3)) and FAISSE. Combat Developments in general, and bureaucrats like Randy Bowerman in particular, should take a lesson from FORSCOM in the streamlining of the acquisition process. It's really amazing what a small shop of hardworking and selflessly dedicated professionals can do. Kudos to J2 FORSCOM for a job well done!

**Richard Groller**  
Former DRAGONFIX Deputy Program Manager  
FORSCOM

(The following is for our readers who may not be familiar with all of the acronyms used in the above letter:

MAC - maintenance allocation chart

GSERD - ground support equipment recommendation data

BOIP - basis of issue plan

QQPRI - qualitative and quantitative personnel requirements information

RPSTL - repair parts and special tools list

O&O - operational and organizational

ILS - integrated logistics support

RECS - rear echelon COMINT Systems

#### Dear Editor:

This letter is in response to the article in the January-March 1990 issue by First Lieutenant Malcolm Cannon, entitled "New Two."

First of all, allow me to establish that his article is 100 percent correct in inferring that S2 work is tough. Unfortunately for the young officer (Cannon), this is one of the few sensible and truthful statements that he

writes in his article.

Cannon instructs new S2 officers that they should obtain the name(s) of their mens' wives. For a young soldier, Cannon has already fallen into the "Old Army" groove of assuming he will not have any female soldiers and need to obtain the names of husbands.

Then the Lieutenant goes into a completely ignorant analysis of senior noncommissioned officers. The areas in which the Lieutenant made gross errors are as follows:

1. He insinuated that the S2 NCOIC would not know the threat because he is combat arms vs. intelligence. I find this statement very difficult to believe. Having served numerous tours with tactical organizations and also having served as an INSCOM representative to such fine organizations as the 3/2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Pond Barracks, Amberg, Germany, I can truthfully state that I never encountered an S2 NCO who was not up to date on the current threat. In fact, I routinely obtained needed border threat data from the S2 NCOs.

2. Would someone please define the term "above average NCO"? Does this mean there are "below average NCOs"? I did not see any reference to "above average officers."

3. The statement, "some-time you will have a sharp NCO...S2 is a dumping ground for senior NCOs who can't handle a line platoon or 1SG position," is pure stupidity. Again, the Lieutenant infers that NCOs are usually inadequate. He has not taken into consideration (undoubtedly due to his lack of experience) that many people, officer and enlisted, are not suited to fill or perform in



leadership positions. Just as there are staff NCOs, there are also staff officers.

4. I take it personally when a Lieutenant or anyone else refers to an NCO as a "senior dud." It is evident that the Lieutenant needs to obtain a quality mentor such as one of my past two battalion commanders; Lieutenant Colonel (P) John Fricas, 163d MIB (TE) or Colonel William C. Llewellyn, 524th MIB. In serving with both of these outstanding officers, I never heard such statements as the type contained in Cannon's article. Both of these outstanding officers always established meaningful, professional relationships with their senior NCOs and enlisted personnel. I have been in meetings (tactical and garrison) with these field grade officers when they established the fact that the NCO was to help train the young Lieutenants to ensure that they were knowledgeable of the mission, the men, and did not make any unsafe or unsound decisions. In other words, the NCO was held responsible for the actions of the new Lieutenant.

5. The statement, "don't drop dimes on the company commander unless it is a last resort." It is this style of leadership (poor), that causes the MI soldier to encounter difficulty when dealing with non-MI organizations. A company commander will not "blow you off." Although I may be mistaken, the company commander could be a "company grade dud."

6. It is poor examples of junior officer leadership, such as those expressed by Cannon, that make young enlisted soldiers wary of commissioned officers. I believe Cannon could better serve our country and

the U.S. Army, by seeking out the advice and mentoring of the previously mentioned officers, or even better, contacting Command Sergeant Major Luther Moore, Jr. of the 66th MI Brigade, to obtain individual training on dealing with the enlisted soldiers and noncommissioned officers.

I hate to be the one to break the news to misunderstood, inexperienced, ignorant people, but enlisted personnel are not

stupid! Most NCOs enjoy wearing the stripes and do not want or desire to be officers (commissioned or warrant). I know that I can better serve my country and the Military Intelligence Corps as a noncommissioned officer and be damn proud of my achievements and stripes.

**Sergeant First Class Michael L. Miller**  
RSMID, 902d MIG

## VANTAGE POINT

(Continued from page 3)

rotational basis. A student complained on a critique that they had to do their PT run through the woods and thought that it was dangerous because someone could get injured. The purpose of PT is to ensure soldiers are physically fit to survive in combat. Shouldn't we experience the difficulty of running cross country in training before we actually have to do it in battle? Makes sense to me!

While I'm on the subject of PT, I don't believe that we increase our physical ability by running in large group runs. We should run in large groups when we want to work on team-building, unit cohesion and esprit about once a month. To increase speed and endurance we should run individually or in ability groups.

Together with performance-oriented training, small group instruction (SGI) is the principal method of training. The goal of NCOES is to develop creative, logical, quick thinking leaders who can apply Army training and fighting doctrine in their units. SGI fosters that goal more than other methodologies and creates quality leader development.

In summary, we must be tactically and technically proficient in order to know, perform and enforce standards. We must conduct the day-to-day tasks necessary to train and take care of soldiers that include the responsibility for equipment, weapons and facilities. These leader development courses provide us the tools and the background to maximize our potential as we progress through the noncommissioned officer ranks.

# Bronco Nine Speaks His Mind



Photos courtesy TSC, Fort Irwin, Calif.

*The following is an interview with Major Steven G. Swanson who is the Brigade S2 Trainer and Senior Intelligence Officer of the Operations Group at NTC.*

**MIPB:** How many battles/rotations do you see a year?

**Swanson:** Fourteen rotations per year, nine to ten battles per rotation. The O/Cs will observe and train the units for each battle, focusing on the planning, preparation and the execution for each mission. They provide feedback to the unit through a formal or informal after action review process. Each after action review ties into seven battlefield operation systems and how each impacted on the battle.

**MIPB:** What can MI soldiers learn at NTC?

**Swanson:** First, they can learn how to perform over a continuous period in a mid-intensity battlefield environment against an uncooperative, highly skilled enemy. Second, they will learn the practical application of common and MOS technical skills such as land navigation, site security, reconstructing radio nets, then applying these techniques to accomplish the collection, processing, analyzing and dissemination of combat information and intelligence the commander can use to defeat the enemy. Finally, in the integration of intelligence as a battlefield operating system with other operating systems, demonstrating that intelligence can be a combat multiplier when

properly integrated to the operation.

**MIPB:** What is the average makeup of the MI unit that trains at NTC?

**Swanson:** I want to answer that in two parts — the MI unit and the S2.

First, the MI unit. An MI company plus — sometimes with a TCAE slice — usually deploys. The equipment levels will vary, normally two to three collection systems, two to three jamming systems, a retrans capability, plus four to six ground surveillance radars. Sometimes two to three LRSU teams will deploy.

As for the S2, normally brigade and battalion S2s will receive augmentation officers, NCOs and junior soldiers to bring the S2 shop to the required strength level. Usually these officers are a lieutenant or captain who will be a new assistant S2 after the rotation is over or a newly assigned force aligned officer who needs training. Depending on the unit, the NCOs and junior soldiers are MOS 96B, 11B or 19D.

**MIPB:** What size unit works best?

**Swanson:** Training proficiency of the unit, not the size of the force, is the real factor. More doesn't mean better nor less mean worse. We have seen MI units with a normal amount of equipment, plus a traffic analyst cell do great. On the other hand, we have seen very well equipped units not produce. MI units that train with a brigade (and I mean **train**, not just a one-time, division- or brigade-level exercise) and know the brigade's

procedures will usually do a better job.

**MIPB:** What things are we doing well?

**Swanson:** The first thing I want to establish is that generally units do better at the end of a rotation than at the beginning. Therefore they achieve the goal of the NTC, which is **training**. During the past rotations the IEW LNOs were coming to the NTC better trained to do the job. MI units coordinate with a maneuver force before entering the zone or the sector. Local site security is good. The MI unit is normally the killer of the dreaded DRT, as both are seeking the best ground to conduct collection operations. Maintenance teams are on the spot in a timely fashion to fix broken equipment. Some units do extremely well with direction-finding operations. These units that enjoy success with RDF do the down-and-dirty stubby pencil analysis when the computer breaks and have trained as a team.

**MIPB:** What are some common training shortfalls MI soldiers or units show at the NTC?

**Swanson:** I will divide that into two areas. First, MI soldiers and individual skills. The average MI soldier needs to improve the use of radio air time. Unnecessary repetition, abuse of pro-words and inappropriate pauses in transmission are common. Unfortunately our soldiers don't understand that they too are subject to enemy direction finding. Next, little-or-no use of the TACREP. This appears to be an ancient art. Our technology gives us the ability to sweep the airwaves and suck in lots of data, but our analysis of the data is decreasing. Therefore the maneuver force commander does not receive the quality SIGINT he requires to support operations. Resection to locate a DF site generally ranges from excellent to poor. Units that use PADS, which by the way are not authorized, have a good success of RDF operation. Operators are

not successful at equating intercept material to assigned target entities. Operators do not have the working aids available such as net diagrams or order of battle notes. Operators superficially reconstruct radio nets. Usually the operator does not recognize the **type** traffic intercept or relate it to the order of battle, therefore the intelligence is lost.

The second area is MI units and collective tasks. We do not update or prepare an enemy or friendly situation map. Nor do we receive environmental logs produced at team level, nor are they requested by the platoon, the company or the TCAE. The result: we cannot perform follow-on radio net and call sign analysis.

Units have problems with target location using radio direction finding. Several factors contribute to this shortfall. Spending hours trying to net the 32Vs, inaccurate location of the DF antenna and no doctrinal templating or terrain analysis, just to name a few. The platoon, company or TCAE does not forward technical data to the operators or provide feedback to the teams. One of the primary causes is a lack of a comprehensive shift-change briefing. We don't get

operations orders to the collection and jamming teams on time, so the operators can know what to do before a battle begins. Finally, no sleep plans.

**MIPB:** Does a unit do better if a TCAE deploys?

**Swanson:** Not necessarily. The key is the TCAE relationship with the companies and the collection and jamming teams, which boils down to basic leadership and the competency of the soldiers working in the TCAE. The TCAE must have trained analysts who direct the SIGINT effort by providing timely ESM and ECM tasks and feedback to the teams, not just suck in data and only direct. One essential thing a TCAE must do is track the battle and compare the DF reports to





the situation. To do this there must be an IPB to determine line-of-sight for DF systems, then compare the DF reports to the IPB. Direct friendly and enemy situation before telling the supported S2 or S3 that an enemy CP is located at X. Simply passing the data to the fire support officer without comparing the report to friendly and enemy disposition wastes time and bullets and can cause fratricide.

**MIPB:** How do you suggest MI commanders prepare their units for rotation at the NTC?

**Swanson:** I will broach that in two areas: the MI unit and the S2.

First, MI units. Train the orders processed within the unit. Work on time management so teams receive ESM and ECM guidance prior to a mission and know whether the unit is attacking or defending. Train with a combat unit that will deploy to the NTC. In doing so, fight against them to practice target identification skills, develop working aids, train other skills and provide feedback to the maneuver unit for OPSEC purposes. Develop a solid relationship between the company platoon and the teams. Work on exchanging technical data, developing data bases, and tracking the enemy and the friendly situation. Conduct IPB with the deploying brigade S2

for line-of-sight, terrain familiarity and order of battle prior to deployment. Develop working relationships with other battlefield operating systems such as fire support and maneuver. Practice radio procedure. Work on reporting the information a commander needs, distinguishing between technical data, combat information and intelligence.

As for the S2, frequently practice the IPB process prior to the arrival at the NTC. Develop a method with the S3 to produce the decision support template/matrix. Think "tactical" for the brigade. Know how the enemy fights at division level and below, apply his tactics to the battlefield, know how he employs his operating systems, and then identify how we can defeat him. Help the battalions fight the battle. Provide analysis

prior to and during a battle. Be proactive and think ahead of the enemy's next move. Develop a good working relationship with the FSC and S3. Learn how to do target value analysis. Integrate and support the scheme of maneuver with a reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Train the S2 section **before** you deploy, **use** them once you deploy. Finally, train the scouts — tell them what you need as an S2.

Something that applies to all the above — "do not NTC the situation."

**MIPB:** How critical is the S2?

**Swanson:** The S2 provides the basis to focus the staff on the enemy, the weather and the terrain when developing the plan. The S2 can win or lose a battle by how well he develops the IPB product, how he analyzes the enemy, and how uncooperative an enemy he is during the planning process. We've seen S2s steer the commander and staff to believe the enemy will accept only one course of action because the S2 developed only one enemy course of action. The commander will make a decision based upon this course of action, then lose the battle because the enemy didn't attack or defend the way the S2 thought. Or, the commander may believe the enemy will execute one course of action, not listen to his S2 or the S2 did not present the intelligence that the enemy is

(Continued on page 12)



# Writer of the Year

The editors and staff of *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* are pleased to announce the winner of the Fourth Annual Writer of the Year Award.

The winner is First Lieutenant Malcom Cannon for his first class "how to be an S2" article, "New Two," printed in our January-March 1990 issue.

The judges on our panel felt it appropriate this time to honor more than one writer. Staff Sergeant Douglas A. Spath, Sr., wrote an exceptional piece, "Exploding NTC Myths" in the July-September 1989 issue and First Lieutenant Steven J. Martin sent us "Custer Didn't Listen" for the April-June 1989 issue. Well Done!

We will send Malcom our MIPB Writer of the Year plaque, a letter from our commanding general, and a sustaining membership in the Intelligence Museum Foundation. Our two runners up will receive letters of commendation and Certificates of Distinction for their contributions.



executing a different course of action, and then lose the battle. Additionally, during planning the S2 will develop R&S plans in conjunction with the S3 to support the scheme of maneuver. During preparation for battle the S2 is the R&S operator. He assists with the security battle by directing assets to look for enemy reconnaissance and passing the data to the fighters. He develops the enemy situation and advises the commander so the commander can change his plans as necessary. He conducts target value analysis with the commander, S3 and FSE. During execution he keeps the commander, staff, and subordinate units informed. He coordinates with the shooters to kill targets. He is proactive and predictive in the analysis of the enemy, basing estimates on his IPB, specifying times the enemy will conduct operations based upon past actions, weather, terrain, and the enemy doctrine. He helps subordinates fight and win. How critical is the S2? He's indispensable. More than one commander has departed NTC with a greater appreciation of the S2.

**MIPB:** How does HUMINT and LRSU figure into the NTC equation?

**Swanson:** We do not play counterintelligence or prisoners of war at NTC. The G2 will script events that will portray these activities in the division and the corps rear area. LRSU usually deploys from two to three teams. Teams are under the 52d Mech Division control, not the brigade. The teams report to the G2 who melds the reports into the overall scenario and provides the reports to the brigade via the division intelligence net as separate reports or INTSUMs. Obviously the S2 can request the G2 for information which the G2 will pass to the LRSD. Often, though, the units treat the LRSD as part of the task force and ask the G2 specifically for the

LRSD to collect the information vice a request for information. The G2 will use the LRSD to develop the deep battle for the brigade and pass reports to the S2 as enemy action occurs.

**MIPB:** What do we need to focus on to improve?

**Answer:** I think this is a three-part answer.

First, doctrine. We must develop an R&S doctrine for division and below. Presently our S2s have little-to-no guidance on how to integrate R&S into the scheme of maneuver, let alone a source document on how to conduct R&S operations. We also need to coordinate with the combat arms to make clear that counterreconnaissance and security is an S3 not an S2 function.

We should resolve the issue of GS and DS, SIGINT and EW support to brigades.

The second part of my answer deals with the MI battalion's collective and individual training. We need to train the order process so the staffs know how to plan, prepare and execute an operation. We need to focus on individual skills identified earlier. If we cannot get our soldiers to perform these tasks we've wasted a lot of money on high tech equipment. Train the TCAE to manage the SIGINT effort.

As for the S2 — be an uncooperative enemy, and provide as comprehensive an IPB as possible for the staff during planning. Develop R&S plans and deconflict R&S operations to support the scheme of maneuver. Quickly analyze the situation, apply the analysis to the event and situation template, and provide proactive, predictive assessments to the commander and the staff. Use the S2 section, don't do it alone. Practice and work with the S3 on the decision support matrix and template. Learn target value analysis skills.

That's all I've got.

*Major Steven G. Swanson has been an infantry platoon leader. He is airborne ranger qualified and a CGSC graduate. He has worked in intelligence jobs ranging from Armor battalion S2 to XO at Field Station Berlin. He is currently assigned to the NTC as the Brigade S2 Trainer and Senior Intelligence Officer of the Operations Group.*



# Snipers

## EXTRA EYES FOR THE S2



by Captain Richard Ellwanger

Does the S2 ever have enough collection assets to support the commander? If you've ever been to the National Training Center this question can cause you to lose those two to four hours of sleep you might get before the regimental attack. Doctrine teaches that the intelligence system tasks all of the people on the battlefield, but this system often has many holes in it. Most of the time, for one reason or another, you will not have all of your scouts or ground surveillance radars. The combat units are often too busy digging, sleeping or fighting the battle to give really good reports. The support units are usually too busy supporting the killers to stop and find a radio to call the S2.

Most infantry battalions have a hidden asset that even the commander doesn't know about or think of — the school-trained sniper. I was in a mechanized division and we had trained snipers in our infantry battalions. Initially, it took some

fancy S4 work to get them the right equipment, but finally we were able to build four complete teams equipped with MILES for the NTC. These teams were made up of very motivated soldiers wanting to use their sniper skills. During the NTC rotation, only two teams were able to be offensively used because of MILES laser failure. However, all four teams were able to give precise and timely combat intelligence. The two teams with working rifles were able to kill over two companies of vehicles, numerous bunkers and OPFOR soldiers including a company command in the defense!

But these soldiers, as effective as they were, were not used to the best of their capability. Most of the time they were not included in any of the battalion staff's planning. Most S3s don't know how to use snipers and they don't worry about them because they are not a million dollar "big bang" system. But, if the sniper is used right he is an effective part of the modern combat team. He can be compared to a hawk, with observation

that misses little and the ability to kill with fearful precision and skill.

Sniper training includes intense sessions of building observation and reporting skills. This training is geared towards the recognition and reporting of large amounts of intelligence and the smallest details of information. These teams use binoculars and high-powered spotting scopes to increase their ability to see in great detail.

The enemy will have his recon people out and one of their favorite targets will be your scouts. Because most mechanized soldiers like to ride (scouts are no exception) and M-113s are great targets for the enemy's artillery, you stand a good chance of losing your scouts. Snipers, on the other hand, work in two-man teams and either walk into their position or are inserted by helicopter. Because of their small size and low priority to the enemy (few commanders will fire artillery on two moving troops in the open) the snipers usually will survive. Our snipers used at NTC were **never** killed or detected during the entire rotation.

Snipers are trained in the use of camouflage and concealment. The snipers are very skillful at making the famous "gillie suit" which allows them to be almost invisible to all but thermal optic systems. Their training also includes the construction of special hideouts or "spider holes" to give them a safe concealed position to observe and report on the enemy until they are withdrawn or they make a kill. In fact, their camouflage skills are often unbelievable. During an ARTEP in Korea, a patrol from the opposing unit actually **stepped on** a sniper and passed by without detecting him. This may or may not be the norm for all snipers, but it gives a good idea of the snipers' capabilities. As a former battalion S2 with four trips to the NTC, I can tell you one key to good recon is not being seen by the enemy.

Normally, counter-recon is an operations function, but because it has the word "recon" in its title the mission is often given to the S2. I know from experience that you are usually given very few of the usual combat assets to accomplish this mission. Your team, if you're lucky, will have a platoon of infantry (already tired from digging all day), a tank platoon and whatever recon assets you have left. This is very sparse considering the job they must do. But, this is where, if you are smart during your train-ups for the NTC, you will get the commander to let you control the snipers. Once they are in your control you can use them as full-time collection assets. The S3

and the commander **will** forget they have snipers.

The sniper teams are very effective recon killers. They can kill with one shot and still be out of range of enemy small arms fire. Because they are highly mobile and hard to locate, it is difficult to bring any effective main gun or indirect fire on their position. Experience in Vietnam, Lebanon and Afghanistan has shown a single bullet killing a key figure will do more damage to an enemy's morale than a big gun killing random individuals in a unit. By setting up a pattern of killing the enemy's scouts, you will paralyze the enemy's ability to do any effective recon. When the enemy has lost his scouts he will be like a blind man following a wall, simply feeling his way to the path of least resistance and to his destruction in your kill zone.

The S2 and the sniper team should work together to learn each other's needs, training routines and methods of working. If the commander will allow it, the snipers and the S2 section should train together in the field and in garrison. The S2 and the most experienced sniper should create a training plan for the snipers, scouts and the intelligence section to include OPFOR training (vehicles, tactics and recon methods), tactics (recon methods), section reporting methods and scout platoon SOPs and training.

This training should not replace the normal sniper training but supplement it. Never forget these teams' first mission to the commander is to kill high payoff targets at the critical time and place. If you do your work right those targets will be the enemy's recon teams, leaders, forward observers and others. Their loss to the enemy will help you guide the unit to where it can destroy the enemy and survive to fight again.

Snipers are a highly skilled asset within your unit that, if you plan ahead, can increase your ability to deny the enemy the battlefield. It is up to you, the S2, to convince the commander that the snipers can be a great help in providing him with intelligence. Remember, as with all assets if you don't task them they probably won't report. It will pay you and your unit to use these skillful soldiers.

*Captain Richard Ellwanger is a graduate of Salisbury State Univ., Md. He attended the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course at Fort Huachuca. His previous assignments included four years at the 5th Division, Fort Polk, La. as 2d Brigade BICC, 3-6 Infantry Battalion S2; 2d Brigade Assistant S2; and Assistant G2 for Training.*



# TOUGH LESSONS

## Learned at the JRTC

by Second Lieutenant Robert A. Ivey

The Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee trains light infantry units by placing them against a tough Latin American-style OPFOR. The exact scenario for each battalion's rotation depends on its training objectives. Let me tell you about a recent rotation and offer you some JRTC lessons learned.

During this rotation our light infantry battalion task force was the 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, 29th Infantry Division (Light) and supporting elements from the Virginia Army National Guard.

The first five days of the operation were low intensity in nature against a guerrilla force. The task force then had two days in which to establish a defense against a motorized rifle battalion. During the last phase of the rotation, the task force attacked the OPFOR in a defensive position.

Through the confusion of the high stress JRTC environment, we learned several specific lessons in communications, enemy prisoners of war (EPW), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), counter-reconnaissance (C-R) and operations security (OPSEC).

### Communications

Effective communication is the life blood of the intelligence officer. At JRTC, this point was painfully brought home. One of our problems was systemic, but mostly it was just a lack of experience. Our rotation marked the first time our battalion was brought together with different components of our MI community and really tested. We found that communications from lower to higher and from left to right were lacking. The remedy is more practice and more opportunities such as rotation to JRTC.

One very important thing to remember is that your commander and S3 are usually fatigued. Their time is divided between a hundred different considerations, so state the obvious. What is clear or easily implied to you can be lost on them.

Draw your boss a picture. Use overlays. Graphics are much more likely to be looked at and understood than a page of written information. This is especially true when you've been awake for 48 hours. Whenever possible, use graphics and supplement them with written bullets.

Since much of the information sent to the S2 section came over the command net, we had to depend heavily on our radio operators. Unfortunately, most of these operators were privates or specialists with very little experience. They had a difficult time keeping accurate traffic records. As a result, confirmation of intelligence items and sources was complicated. Also, many of the operators didn't recognize the value of some of the traffic they were receiving. For example, our battalion was in the defense when an enemy recon team engaged one of our roadblocks. It was vital that this information reach the S2 as it indicated not only the enemy avenue of approach but also how close the enemy battalion was. However, the S2 didn't receive the information for several hours.

The systemic problem was that there wasn't a dedicated, vehicle-mounted radio for the battalion S2 to use to stay on the brigade operations and intelligence (O&I) net. More than once we attempted to maintain contact using a PRC-77, but distance and terrain made this impossible. Because of this problem, large amounts of intelligence traffic was lost. The brigade S2 was also unable to communicate with his subordinate S2s at critical times. By doctrine, the S3 has three VRC 46s to stay on the battalion command, the brigade command and the brigade O&I nets. In reality we've only been able to mount two radios in a HMMWV, and they stay on the command nets. Even if we did manage to mount the third radio it would be impracticable for both the S2 and S3 shops to work out of one vehicle.

The best solution, as I see it, is to change the TOE of the light infantry units to include a HMMWV exclusively for the S2 shop. The HMMWV should have two radio systems, the GRC 160 and the VRC 47. The VRC 47 actually

has two parts to it: a VRC 46 which would be on the brigade O&I net and a R442 which is a receiver only on the battalion command net. The R442 is useful since much of the battalion's intelligence comes over this net. The GRC 160 is a vehicle-mounted PRC 77 which would be on the battalion O&I net.

Lacking this change in TOE, couriers, routing and using dedicated radios are some solutions to this problem. The courier system will probably be limited to short (walking) distances since a light infantry unit has very little organic transportation. On today's fast paced battlefield, this means of communication isn't always time sensitive.

By routing, I mean that if the battalion assistant S3 is at the brigade tactical operations center he should see if the S2 section has anything to be passed along. This is especially helpful when you have hard copy material that is impractical to send by radio. Any person traveling to or from any unit should be used to pass along information. It is common sense, but it's often overlooked. Again, the drawback is that routing is not time sensitive.

The last solution, dedicated radios, is the most commonly used at our unit. Unfortunately, this interferes with other nets, usually the command net. There are two variations to this "mortal sin" — using the battalion or brigade command radio and changing the frequency to the brigade O&I, or using the brigade command net to pass along intelligence information between the S2s. If you either tie up or leave a command net you can usually count on hearing about it!

### Enemy Prisoners of War

Unfortunately, there wasn't much counterintelligence play at JRTC. But, there were EPWs to handle. During most FTXs, the EPW system isn't really used. At JRTC we discovered that if you don't use it, you don't know it's broke. It's easy to drop the ball when the S1 has overall responsibility for EPWs; the S4 is responsible for transporting them; and the S2 is responsible for interrogating them and for processing and passing the intelligence received from them.

At our last after action review we discovered just how bankrupt our system was. When asked how many EPWs we had captured, our best response was, "nine or ten." The observer/controller then told us that we had captured 19. Of those 19, only six had initial reports sent to brigade. Many of these reports were received up to 12 hours after the EPWs were captured. This

means that any time-sensitive information obtained from EPWs was lost. The problems didn't stop there. Of all the EPWs captured, we only managed to get one interrogation report back to brigade.

The solution for this is to set up and enforce procedures. Commanders need to make sure that the EPW system is used during FTXs. In peacetime it is easy to forget how important the EPW system can be. If the pressure was put on and we suddenly found ourselves faced with this requirement, many units wouldn't be able to cope.

### Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

During the defense phase at JRTC there were two parallel roads in our sector that the OPFOR could have used for rapid avenues of approach. One followed a long stretch of high ground, and the other followed a valley floor. Using IPB we decided that the enemy would use the valley road. The night before the attack we received a weather report from brigade that we were to get a fair amount of rain. It's here that something should have clicked in our minds. We were in a daze from constant operations and missed the implication that the rain would run off the high ground into the valley and obviously slow down the OPFOR vehicles. The OPFOR changed their plans and took the high road. We didn't update our IPB and paid for it. In retrospect, it seems impossible that we made such a basic mistake, but fatigue can take its toll.

On a more positive note, our IPB for the low intensity phase was more successful. Because we were light infantry ourselves, we knew that traditional obstacle overlays were irrelevant. One of the greatest advantages of a guerrilla force is rapid foot movement over rough terrain. Conversely, one of his most vulnerable points is logistics, and this is where we concentrated our efforts.

The OPFOR had to man-pack their supplies and cache them whenever possible. It was these cache points and their patrol bases that we attempted to locate. We did this by looking at areas with cover and concealment, thick canopy closure, and identifiable infiltration and exfiltration routes. Identifiable routes could be creek beds, draws or small trails which offered concealment and could be used as navigational aids.

The overlays that we did develop paid off since we located a couple of caches and a patrol base. But, we were unable to do enough damage to prevent the guerrillas from sustaining their forces.

Despite this, I feel we were on the right track.

### **Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Counter-Reconnaissance**

An analysis of enemy equipment and tactics is necessary for establishing an effective R&S or C-R plan. I had never fought armor or mechanized infantry and I fell short in evaluating my opponent. I failed to place myself in the enemy commander's boots. He was facing a light infantry battalion with minimal organic antiarmor capabilities. Because of poor weather we could not

count on our COLT teams, attack helicopters and close air support capabilities. The reality of the situation was that without those attached assets, in the terrain we were defending, we weren't much more than a speed bump for an armored unit.

The enemy's final objective was an airport several kilometers to my battalion's rear. His immediate objective was to pass through our sector as quickly as possible and deploy only when forced to. With only two high-speed avenues of approach available, these should have become the absolute center of my C-R plan. Instead, I used the guerrilla C-R approach, patrolling and establishing ambush sites along the FLOT.

When the enemy hit the one ambush site on each road, they simply backed up, went around, and got back on the road further down. A series of vehicular ambush sites down the length of the road would have been much more effective. This would have prevented or destroyed their recon efforts.

The battalion S2 must assume much of the operational responsibilities for reconnaissance and maintain close coordination with the S3 and fire support officer. The S2 section must personally brief and debrief patrols. I found this very difficult to do, however, since the TOC had very few vehicles. Usually, I had to rely on radio reports that were sometimes far from complete or accurate. Another consideration is the human factor. If you don't get together with your scouts and patrols this can come across as disinterest. Next time they may not work as hard for you. A way has to be found to move the intelligence officer or NCO around the battlefield. Again, a TOE change giving the S2 shop its own vehicle would solve this important problem.

However, one aspect of our reporting system worked very well. A ground surveillance radar squad was assigned a direct support mission to our battalion. Instead of placing them on our battalion O&I net we let them stay on their own internal platoon net and land lined their platoon NCOIC into the TOC. This way we allowed our ground surveillance radar NCO to receive and collate the information before passing it on to us. We didn't have to worry about three different teams, only one headquarters element.

During the low intensity conflict phase, the mission is to find and destroy an ill-defined and elusive enemy. This battle is two thirds intelligence and one third fighting. The battalion should be broken down into platoon- and squad-



sized patrols which have their own areas of operation. These forces should only be concentrated to eliminate targets of value that the platoon can't handle alone. Also, a battalion reaction force with helicopters or vehicles for rapid movement should be on standby.

Most commanders and S3s will fight vigorously against this suggestion for fear of losing command and control. A decentralized battalion, however, would provide a more difficult target and would also give the enemy S2 the same headache he has given you.

If the battalion is maneuvered as a whole against several small units that are operating under close coordination, I feel the battalion is severely disadvantaged. Two of the light infantry's primary advantages are stealth and speed. Both are sacrificed with companies moving in column. Not only is a battalion easier to track, but pursuing a guerrilla force with a large formation is like trying to outmaneuver and overtake a speedboat with a battleship. Sure, you have plenty of firepower in one place, but the enemy can simply stay out of reach. He can choose the time and place to engage you.

This is usually in the form of sniping, booby trapping and ambushing. He will try to prevent you from accomplishing your mission by whittling away your forces. He will avoid what you want most — a decisive battle.

One final advantage of decentralized operations is that you will be able to provide more intelligence, since you're covering more of the battlefield. A better informed commander will be able to make sounder decisions.


### Operational Security

No unit will ever be able to have complete OPSEC. Troops become tired and carry mission notes on them. CEOs become compromised and radio operators transmit in the clear. At JRTC the OPFOR S2 brought with him to the final after action brief all of our compromised material. He had to carry it in a 12'x10'x6' box! They had

the entire battle roster for our CEWI company, CEOs, complete operation orders, mission notes, overlays and much more. This was much worse than we'd expected. They showed us transcripts of our troops giving their grid location in the clear. As a matter of fact, the scorecard for hard intelligence reports intercepted from low level voice traffic was very uneven.

OPFOR	PHASE	TASK FORCE
49	Low Intensity Conflict	6
8	Defense Against MRB	2
15	Attack Against OPFOR	2

Many soldiers just don't practice OPSEC during FTXs. It's a nuisance which they often circumvent, but can ill afford to do so. Soldiers will



fight like they're trained. More than one person "died" at JRTC as a direct result of OPSEC violations. Command emphasis is needed to bring OPSEC under tight control. You can't begin to understand its importance until there's a trained OPFOR using it against you.

### Conclusion

With the continued instability of many Third World countries and the decreasing threat of a European war, low intensity conflict will probably play a larger role in the Army's future. The light infantry and JRTC will become increasingly important. JRTC is a unique place for the MI community to actually practice and use skills that are often only read about in field manuals. This type of force-on-force play is essential to testing intelligence systems. You must go to JRTC with the desire to learn not to keep score. Winning is doubtful, learning is certain!

*Second Lieutenant Robert A. Ivey graduated from Virginia Tech. He served in the Virginia Army National Guard as a light infantry scout platoon leader and is presently the BICC for 1-116 infantry, 29th Infantry Division (L).*



# Reflections on JRTC:

## Fort Chaffee from a Platoon Leader's Perspective

by Second Lieutenant Tristan Siegel

Deployment to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Chaffee, Ark. is an excellent training opportunity for a voice collection platoon. However, soldiers must prepare for the fact that JRTC is not an electronic warfare support measures-rich environment. My experience as a voice collection platoon leader at JRTC is consistent with the themes of many after-action articles describing maneuver force rotations to both JRTC and NTC. Realistic force-on-force scenarios spotlight the need to emphasize the basics. In my experience, our greatest weakness and consequently our most valuable lessons learned were in the area of common soldier skills.

### SIGINT Overview

The signals environment at JRTC is quite sparse. The OPFOR is very familiar with the terrain, the missions and each other. It appears that they conduct most of their coordination in accordance with SOP, by habit, through face-to-face meetings, or over landline. The volume of OPFOR radio traffic is initially very low with operators employing disciplined OPSEC. Low-level voice intercept teams should not be discouraged, however. The OPFOR has no secure communications gear and only limited, crude jamming means. Since the maneuver area is relatively small with little insurmountable blocking terrain, most high ground has excellent line of sight intercept potential. Virtually all OPFOR communications are limited to the 30-55 megahertz frequency range.

Inevitably, OPFOR OPSEC deteriorates significantly as they encounter obstacles. As the exercise progresses, there are increasing spurts of time-sensitive, high value traffic. Collection team

members must be patient and diligent. A surprisingly large portion of the traffic which we did intercept compromised enemy locations, activities, intentions and personalities. Two notable incidents come to mind.

On one occasion, an obviously tired and frustrated OPFOR driver whose vehicle had become stuck in the mud gave away not only his own position but the location and direction of movement of a number of other members of his unit. BLUEFOR artillery, targeted on the basis of a single line of bearing and the actual message content, added insult to injury. The liaison officer soon confirmed numerous OPFOR KIAs!

Similarly, two OPFOR vehicles were so anxious to link up with each other at a rendezvous point that they described the ridgeline, east-west road and terrain features accurately enough for technical analysis cell analysts to pinpoint each of their locations. Furthermore, the simple one-for-one letter substitution system used contained two pairs of double letters, thus enabling analysts to partially crack the OPFOR encryption code and verify the four digit grid coordinate of the rendezvous point. BLUEFOR field artillery once again scored confirmed KIAs and boosted both 98G and 98C morale!

Due to the limited nature of the message traffic, operators have a tendency to adopt a "take whatever you can get" attitude in terms of intercept reporting. Priority intelligence requirements/information requirements and current friendly and enemy SITMAPS are thus seen to be of minimal utility to intercept operators. Since 98-series analysts receive very little practice at JRTC, they may become lax in prioritizing collection efforts; distinguishing significant, reportable items; analyzing message externals; and logically

comparing intercepted content against the current friendly and enemy situation. Consequently, friendly forces have a tremendous vulnerability: DECEPTION.

We are extremely susceptible to OPFOR deception operations. Through the use of false nets, they could probably convince us to expend precious field artillery and close air support on non-existent targets, deceive us as to the location and progress of their main effort, and divert valuable voice collection assets from collecting against actual enemy nets. They could further introduce an element of doubt into the BLUEFOR decision cycle by destroying the credibility of MI assets in the eyes of the brigade command and staff elements. They could persuade us to react to false information or dissuade us from taking action based on valid intercept data. At the very least, OPFOR deception could sufficiently erode confidence in intelligence reports to reduce the timeliness of friendly responses. We were fortunate that the OPFOR did not conduct extensive deception operations against us. Future rotations might not be so lucky. Leaders must ensure that all personnel strictly adhere to proper standards of thorough analysis. Mental discipline can increase both the quantity of the traffic intercepted and the quality of the analytical product used to support the brigade commander.

### Lessons Learned

Communication is the key to success. I found that the critical link is between the platoon operations center and the intelligence and electronic warfare support element. The platoon operations center should collocate with the MI company/team headquarters and its supporting supply and maintenance sections. Whenever tactically feasible, the platoon operations center should be in landline distance of the brigade tactical operations center and close enough for periodic face-to-face contact, an important part of keeping abreast of the current situation. The platoon operations center should also have at least one voice intercept asset either collocated with it or within landline range. Too much content, as well as time, is lost in the stilted format of radio messages, especially when a lack of secure communications equipment forces operators to painstakingly encrypt and decrypt. "Green gear" is virtually essential between low-level voice intercept teams, the platoon operations center, and the liaison officer. Although we did experience radio equipment failures, at no point did we

encounter any line of sight communications difficulty.

I highly recommend the use of a civilian scanner (justifiable as a PRD-10 equivalent). Although we had tremendous success with a Radio Shack PRO-2024, the PRO-2004 is probably ideal. My operators praised the scanner and claimed that it could do the work of three PRD-11s. I found that the best use of the PRD-11 is primarily as a means of identifying the new active enemy frequencies to build the data base maintained by the platoon operations center, the acting technical control and analysis element. These new frequencies can then be programmed into the scanner. While the scanner is rather inefficient in the "search" mode, it is quite effective in the "scan" mode. Unlike the PRD-11, it can rapidly leap large distances on the spectrum to lock on to a channel almost the instant that it becomes active. It provides maximum coverage with minimum lost intercept. The only shortcoming of the scanner is its lack of direction finding capability. Specialized couplers should be purchased from an electronics store to enable users to connect a 292 to the scanner and to facilitate the rapid exchange of 292 and direction finding antennas for the PRD-11.

I further suggest that the platoon operations center vehicle be carefully organized for maximum efficiency. It should be equipped with two vehicle-mounted radios — one for the company/team command net (since the platoon operations center usually functions as the company headquarters/operations center), and one for the brigade intelligence net (since SALUTE reports may not be relayed to the platoon operations center in a timely manner, if at all). A PRC-77 should also be taken for use as a spare or even as an additional intercept receiver. The platoon operations center must be prepared with all the graphic aids (maps, charts, diagrams) normally associated with the technical control and analysis element, since it is the only keeper of the technical data base at JRTC. (The notional G2 will **not** provide any technical support.) Detailed, accurate logs and pass-on briefing books prove crucial to efficient and effective operations.

One of the hardest lessons we learned at JRTC concerned deploying assets and survivability. Platoon and team leaders must be proactive and detailed in their planning, coordinating and briefing of orders. Teams must be as functionally independent and logistically self-sufficient as possible. They should be flexible and prepared for all

contingencies. Vehicles should travel during daylight hours, with radics, and in groups of at least two to discourage the numerous small OPFOR ambushes. Detailed coordination must be made with all affected friendly units and alternative means of transportation must be considered. The following JRTC "war stories" drive home the above points quite dramatically.

Early in the exercise, one low-level voice intercept team prepared for an airmobile insertion operation. However, due to delays experienced by the maneuver force to provide security on the drop zone, the team spent almost 48 hours at the airfield awaiting transportation — time which it could have spent conducting its mission at a closer intercept site. Not only did the team miss out on potential combat information and beneficial training, but team morale plummeted.

The team did eventually lift off but was greeted by OPFOR fire just moments after landing on the drop zone. Their helicopter was subsequently shot down and the team was separated. The remnants of the team waited in vain for several hours for the MIAs to link up at the predesignated rally point. The company XO and a driver set out to retrieve two soldiers with whom the platoon operations center still had communications. Moments after the rescue team called in its last checkpoint, the low-level voice intercept team reported incoming artillery and OPFOR activity in its immediate area. Suddenly, both elements, each located in approximately the same grid square, lost contact. Both elements had fallen prey to OPFOR ambushes. Other unrelated OPFOR ambushes wiped out our electronic countermeasures/deception team twice in less than a week.

After the 24-hour personnel replacement period, all our MIAs finally returned from their respective stays as POWs or KIAs (at the "dead tent"). We were then able to actually field both of our low-level voice intercept teams and our electronic countermeasures/deception team all at the same time. Forty-eight hours later, at the conclusion of the next battle, we received orders to redeploy a low-level voice intercept team farther forward for the platoon's next mission. We decided that we would also simultaneously deploy the jamming team, rotate some of the personnel in our forward low-level intercept team, and conduct a resupply mission. Here are some of the problems we encountered.

During the linkup with the low-level voice intercept team, we spotted a three-man patrol

moving toward us. We immediately dismounted and assumed a hasty defense. After several minutes without contact, the first sergeant decided to patrol along the road. We lost sight of the sergeant in the woodline and subsequently heard four rapid shots and the sickening whine of MILES gear. After several attempts to contact the sergeant, we piled our vulnerable teams into our two vehicles as fast as we could and raced off in time to avoid the artillery dropping on the area as we left. When we ran into a small ambush at the next intersection that peppered the sides of our vehicles, we decided to cut our losses and return to the company headquarters for the night. It was not until the next morning that we learned that we had stumbled into the perimeter of a friendly unit. There had been no OPFOR in the area all night!

Disheartening as these stories may be, the experiences impressed upon us many indelible lessons. Moving an asset is an inherently dangerous operation, especially in a low-intensity conflict environment where there are no clear boundaries between friendly and enemy ground. A team need not move unless the terrain and tactical situation absolutely mandate relocation. A good intercept site in a position of relative safety is preferable to a great location that a team may never reach alive or one that is likely to be overrun, whether by friendly or enemy forces. We learned the hard way that friendly fire most certainly is not! Platoon and team leaders must coordinate thoroughly with all friendly units anywhere near a proposed route or location.

We can only be thankful that this was an exercise and not actual combat. At JRTC we had the freedom to make mistakes and the luxury of living to learn from them. The knowledge that we obtained at Fort Chaffee may someday save our lives. I wholeheartedly endorse a JRTC rotation for all soldiers. In my opinion, it is the most realistic low-intensity training available anywhere!

*Second Lieutenant Tristan Siegel was the voice collection platoon leader of A Company, 629th MI Battalion (CEWI) before becoming the company XO. He has recently transferred to the Virginia Army National Guard upon selection as the Aide-de-Camp to the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 29th Infantry Division (Light). Siegel was nominated for both the Maryland and Army Commendation Medals for his service with the MI battalion during his JRTC rotation.*





# *The Hohenfels Experience - Success at CMTC*

by First Lieutenant Tay C. Weber

After action reviews at NTC and CMTC (Hohenfels) emphasize the importance of intelligence to winning or losing on the battlefield. There are steps that the battalion S2 can take to increase his and his unit's chance of success. Some of these things are just good tactical procedures that would be useful in a real-world situation. Others are linked to the competition of the Hohenfels Training Area.

## **Garrison Preparation**

You can do a lot of preparation before you even set foot on the Hohenfels reservation. Start with a map recon, templates and enemy order of battle. Hopefully, the former S2 left a Hohenfels Training Area map with a terrain analysis overlay in the S2 shop. If not, it is simple enough to do your own. For newcomers to Germany, I strongly recommend a ground recon of the Hohenfels Training Area with someone who knows the terrain.

Due to terrain constrictions and the relatively small size of the training area (approximately 8 kilometers by 25 kilometers), doctrinal and situational templates are easily done to cover most, if not all, possible scenarios. Mounted avenues of approach are easily identified, though dismounted avenues are a bit more difficult to cover thoroughly. From these templates, you can create a tentative collection plan that you can adjust dur-

ing the actual ARTEP.

Many commanders and S3s will look at you like you are an alien when you mention a decision support template (DST). But, if you want to win use it! If you want to push for its use, the time to do it is while in garrison. The key is to catch the battalion commander, S3 and fire support officer as they first begin to develop battle plans for the ARTEP. The staff is too busy when they are out playing in the yard to worry about developing a DST. Like the collection plan, do it in garrison and adjust it during the ARTEP.

It will help you to have some kind of quick reference system for enemy order of battle. A fellow S2 at my last post typed up 3 x 5 index cards with formations, distances and number and type of vehicles associated with Soviet offense and defense. The cards were copied, laminated and given out to everyone down to vehicle commander level. The S2 had his quick reference system and all vehicle commanders knew what to look for. This is only one method and you can use whatever works best for you.

You further help your cause by conducting brief classes on enemy compositions and formations. Classes can also include reporting of sightings. It may seem obvious that the SALUTE format is preferred, but spot reports often come in incomplete. Detailed spot reports make the job much easier.

You can get weather and light data in garrison from the G2. Knowledge of general light and



weather patterns will help in the planning of recon missions, mission-oriented protection posture levels, etc. (Weather is real easy at Hohenfels — early morning fog, followed by periods of rain, followed by darkness until early morning.)

Probably the most important thing an S2 can do during the pre-battle or pre-line of departure time period is to use all of the resources he can get. This includes ground surveillance radar, scouts, aero scouts, etc. Request from higher everything you even think you can use. The worst higher can do is say "no."

Give the scouts a copy of the named areas of interest. Tell them what to look for and kick them out. Keep them out as long as possible to maintain continuous collection, even between missions. Let the scout platoon leader pick his own positions and call them in to you.

The same principles apply to your ground surveillance radar. Again, let the platoon or section leader pick his own spots, especially if you're not experienced with the working of the ground surveillance radars.

Coordinate as early as possible for helicopters to give you recon and attack support. Close air support is now coordinated through S2 channels so get with the S3 or battalion commander to request fast movers.

Stay on the higher S2 to get intelligence summaries, current weather, radio frequency interfaces, help covering the named areas of interest, and anything you can get.

Drop off one of your secure nets and scan the airwaves for enemy nets. The OPFOR is always in the plain. Late night or very early morning is a good time to do this since friendly nets are generally quiet then and enemy deception nets usually start around line of departure time. Send the frequencies and call signs to brigade and let them decide to collect or jam. Or, just listen in yourself. OPFOR nets are broadcast in English. If you're lucky, you may intercept an observer or controller net. Some people consider this cheating. I consider this competition. It's not your fault if the observers or controllers are in the plain!

Stay alive. Remember to sleep and eat. A "toasted" S2 is of no use to anyone. Use your battlefield information coordination center, NCOICs, radio telephone operators, etc. to handle spot reports and radios while you get a few hours sleep. You're the one who has to brief the enemy situation, fight the battle, go to the after action review, and prepare the next intelligence summary for the next operations order.

Brief the enemy locations and obstacles in a logical order; i.e. in the order a maneuver company commander is likely to face them. Some S2s get so excited or are so tired that they bounce back and forth across the map when briefing.

Ensure that your track has maps containing friendly graphics as well as enemy graphics. This is especially important when the tactical operations center jumps. If you have assumed the battle and have no friendly graphics, it's embarrassing to have the battalion commander or XO ask about friendly positions.

### **During The Battle**

Your job during the battle is pretty straightforward — continue to plot spot reports, analyze the information and GET IT OUT. Get it to the battalion commander so he can make decisions. Get it to the S3 so he can move the companies. Get it to the fire support officer so he can get fires on important targets. Pre-printed spot report formats with carbon copies allow quick passing of grids and targets to the fire support officer and the S3. Although you are often relegated to a "speak only when spoken to" role regarding the battalion command net, no commander will chew you out for passing important intelligence on the net. This is especially true if you talk directly to the commander. Monitor battalion command and pump the scouts and the brigade S2 for all the information you can get.

Don't be afraid to assume the net control station (temporarily at least). By doctrine, the S3 section has the net control station for the battalion command net. But their radios can go down and nothing upsets a commander faster than not being able to talk to someone. Go ahead and assume the net and relay messages when necessary. You may not get any credit for taking over the net, but if no one takes over, everybody hears about it later.

### **Conclusion**

With good preparation in garrison, good use of resources and some initiative, you can survive the rigors of a CMTC ARTEP, help your unit accomplish its mission, and avoid taking too many shots in the shorts during the after action reviews.

*First Lieutenant Tay C. Weber graduated from Penn State and the Univ. of Richmond. He has been a tank platoon leader, assistant S2 and battalion S2 at 1-35 AR in Erlangen, FRG.*



for poor planning and faulty decision making.

I would not be surprised to discover that documents and lesson plans even at the Intelligence School talk about IPB, clearly referring exclusively to the PRODUCT rather than the PROCESS. We have to think of the IPB presentation at the decision brief as an IPR, an in-process review of intelligence

Because I believe that it makes a difference what we call things — the very name of something leads us to assume something about it. I have all sorts of problems with "intelligence preparation of the battlefield." It begs us to assume it is an intelligence product or, in the best of worlds, an intelligence process. We don't say, "operations courses of action" even though they are prepared by and briefed by the G3, with input and assistance from all of the battlefield operating systems. IPB is really CEB, the commander's estimate of the battlefield, or maybe the commander's examination of the battlefield. Until we are certain that the commander is the conductor rather than the audience for this process, we are not where we want to be.

### The Good News

The good news is that we can get there without having to change the name of IPB or even its present format as part of the decision briefing. We need to end the IPB presentation at the decision brief with a series of decisions by the commander leading to an integrated collection effort. We will probably want to wait until after the courses of action brief so that the commander has a firm picture of friendly courses of action. The collection effort is an organization for combat. It ought to be briefed as such. Just as in any plan, we want to synchronize available assets to the task at hand. That is, we want to determine the sequence, combination and duration of each of our collection means "aimed" at specific indicators which will answer the PIR.

### Collection Plan

The intelligence community already has such a collection effort which they call the "collection plan." This plan directs the efforts of the more traditional collection means (Quickfix, PRD-11, LRSD). Formats for the collection plan appear in Appendix H of Field Manual 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*. These seem perfectly suitable and should be used as a start point from which to modify for local commanders or specific situations. We are going to want to be

looking at a lower level than the corps assets depicted in the field manual, but the principle applies. What remains is for the commander to direct the efforts of the total force toward the collection and processing of essential battlefield intelligence. That effort is currently buried in paragraph 3 of the Intelligence Annex in "Intelligence Acquisition Tasks."

The problem is not so much that no one reads these taskings (although that may be more true than we wish), but that they are not put in the context of the commander's intent for the overall plan. The result is an ineffective collection effort. The overall collection effort is too important to the conduct of battle not to use all available means. Aviators, fire support teams, surveyors, signal personnel (to name a few) number in the hundreds across the division front. These potential sources have radios, many are specifically trained in target identification, some have digital communications means and formatted entry devices capable of rapid and far-reaching dissemination of information. Their contributions cannot be left to chance.

As in any organization for combat, the key to decision making is the appropriate matching of unit or sub-unit capabilities against requirements. The requirements must be determined as the first step. The determination of the requirements answers the question, "What is it we are trying to do here?" Since it is critical that those requirements relate to the battle(s) at hand, we are going to want to create something that looks like a decision support template. That template needs to be "overlaid" on the intelligence IPR we now call IPB and the friendly course of action decided upon. What we are doing here is to get about the job of making intelligence preparation of the battlefield everybody's business. Let's not apologize for the fact that the resulting graphic display is going to be "busy." Battle is busy. Busy does not mean fuzzy, which is exactly what we are left with if all the information and requirements and assets are not considered as a single piece

### Decision Support Template

This cannot be a G2 or S2 product. This is a decision support template. Decisions are made by the commander. Decision support templates cannot be "presented"; they must be determined at the decision brief. In a simplistic capsule, the IPB (intelligence IPR presented by the G2) said, "This is what we know about enemy disposition



and capabilities." The decided upon course of action said, "This is what we want to do to the enemy." The decision support template says, "Here are the times and the points and the areas where we need specific pieces of information in order to be able to update and expand our knowledge of enemy disposition and capabilities as they relate to current and future friendly courses of action." Finally, the collection effort (which like the intelligence collection plan, the fire support plan and others will be greatly influenced by the decision support template) will establish the specific requirements for all sources to discover, confirm or update critical data which will provide the commander with options to defeat the enemy.

We cannot "wargame" courses of action without the "game board" provided by the intelligence IPR (aka IPB). Any "wargaming" which deals solely with friendly courses of action is a scrimmage without the opposition, and worse still it is a still picture analysis of what will be a motion picture event. In order for us to progress toward where we want to be in this arena, we need some real courage on the part of our Military Intelligence people and our "2 shops" as a group. They currently have a winner (if we are to judge solely by approval and applause). What I'm asking is that we take that current winner and expose it for what it is — a necessary backdrop for the "real" winner, the decision support template. I'm asking for the courage to step out from behind a splendid display of the intelligence art and expose ourselves to interactive discussion, weighing and deciding of the critical calculus of battle in real time. If not in front of "God and everyone," at least in front of the commander and everyone. I do believe that this will take courage. It is simply easier and safer to prepare the thorough but static intelligence IPR (aka IPB) than to participate in the dynamic wargaming and decision making associated with the decision support template. I as firmly believe that there is great reward in store. Demanding that this wargaming takes place requires some courage on the part of the commander as well. It will require a rather public demonstration of a thorough grasp of friendly and enemy capabilities in all of the battlefield operating systems and some real-time decisions.

The decision support template, created in a dynamic setting, will tempt us less to the thought that it is a product. Its very creation outlines the need for update and refinement. Further, it gives structure to that update and refinement tempo-

rally and geographically. Its implementation by means of the collection plan (and its influence on other implementing plans) ensures the integration of the entire force in the gathering of critical battlefield intelligence. Finally, it focuses the efforts of the force. There is more data available than there is information. Data is not information without processing. A critical part of the processing is the relating of data to specific times or locations or both. The collection plan, in its role of implementing the decision support template will begin that processing. In short, we will have told the force at large what any scout platoon leader will have told his scouts: "Here's your intelligence gathering mission, here's where you go, what you look for, and to whom you report it."

The continuous process of IPB and of the decision support template techniques may be illustrated with a suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) plan. As the force contemplates using helicopter assets to launch an air assault, the artillery will prepare a SEAD plan. Because of the nature of enemy air defense systems, their discovery is difficult and the likelihood of their remaining static is unlikely. This makes the practice of compiling a target list an incomplete and unlikely solution. Neither can we wait until election of pick-up zones and landing zones and connect the two with a straight line air corridor for the artillery and other assets to suppress. Preparing for the execution of an air assault begins as early as the receipt of any unit mission which may possibly utilize an air assault as part of the plan or branches to that plan. Early investigation of likely enemy locations, template techniques, coordination with Air Force and Army aviation, together with analysis of the benefits of terrain masking of enemy capabilities, planned Air Force suppression activities and so forth will combine to describe a "best fit" breaching corridor. The intent is to utilize this breaching corridor or corridors as a sort of autobahn into enemy territory, and then plan a supplemental program for the "off-ramp" necessary to reach the desired LZ. Early establishment of the breaching corridor allows us to aim intelligence assets of our own and higher headquarters (anticipated air assaults may well be aimed in areas which, initially, would be considered "deep") toward refinement of the intelligence picture as the battle progresses. It allows the selection of appropriate intelligence acquisition taskings for subordinate units and the updating of those taskings as the picture becomes clearer. As part of the synchronization



process, the status of the air corridor, as targets are attacked and intelligence is refined, is continually updated and incorporated into future operations. In the division I am most familiar with, this updating is centralized at the FSE, but both G3 and G2 seem viable candidates for this approach. As this example points out, the decision, made early on, to prepare the battlefield by continuous and coordinated effort will aid in the critical decisions to be made later in the conduct of the battle. Thus intelligence preparation of the battlefield does not serve so much to predict the battlefield as to prepare the decision maker. Continuous IPB does not prepare the battlefield, really it prepares the commander.

### Priority Intelligence Requirements

As a quick means for an after action review of where your unit currently is in this proper pursuit of the IPB process, use a matrix which approximates the collection plan format. List PIR across the top and intell assets plus named areas of interest down the side. Compare each of the intelligence assets (consider capabilities, location, and command and control relationships which have applied during the course of the action) to each of the PIR with the question: "Could this asset with its capabilities as modified by position and command and control relationship have contributed to the resolution of this PIR?" Next, look at the named areas of interest. Ask the question: "Would attention to this named area of interest have likely contributed to the resolution of each PIR, in turn?" The standard by which to measure is the degree of resolution of each PIR by means of the assets assigned to the job and the reporting channels available. A more detailed assessment would include a 20/20 hindsight evaluation of timeliness, effects of weather, threat activities which might have been addressed by repositioning or a change in mission and so forth.

### Conclusions

As a result of honing our skills in the process described above, we have the additional benefit of knowing exactly where the holes are. That is, we can make requests to higher headquarters for additional assets with a degree of specificity which will make it easier for those headquarters to respond favorably.


This process is going to have to begin at the division level, but it cannot end there. The intelligence acquisition taskings need to come wrapped in the commander's intent. This provides the con-

text for the collection effort and keys the subordinate headquarters to the refinement of its own PIR and IPB processing. The PIR of a subordinate headquarters are different from those of the next higher headquarters. That may seem obvious, but unless it is stressed, you will find too many cases of subordinate units simply repeating the PIR of the higher headquarters. Different as it is, it is certainly related. It differs in specificity, immediacy and geography; it is related by the commander's intent for the selected course of action.

This is not easy stuff; it is only necessary. Every time we are fortunate enough to go to the NTC or JRTC or run a BCTP exercise, we are rewarded or penalized for our handling of the dynamic process of battlefield intelligence. This is difficult to replicate at home station. Force on force is expensive in resourcing. Major events sequence lists are not satisfying to the intelligence staff officers (who probably wrote them) nor do these lists typically involve other than staff sections. We end up solving the easy half of the equation when we get a report at an S2 section that a patrol has discovered such and such. The hard part is determining what it is we want our patrols to look for, when and to whom will they report what they have seen (and what they have not seen), how much of that gets to the S2 and to the commander and so forth. We need more training of the process "on the cheap." I'll settle for ten 3 x 5 cards handed to the FIST, the radars, the patrols, the ammo section and the helicopter pilot at various times during a training exercise. Individually the cards may not say much, but together, passed through the right channels, they should allow a conclusion which will reward the unit discovering. We can trace these reports (by the way, just outlining where the reports SHOULD go is a training benefit) and assess where we need to improve in our intelligence awareness. This will work even at company level, where the company commander is his own S2.

Most of us have experienced the satisfaction of announcing with certainty, that "Colonel Mustard did it in the billiard room, with the lead pipe." The rewards on the battlefield are much more exciting, but without making IPB everybody's business we will proceed without a CLUE.

*Colonel Mark R. Hamilton is the Commander, 6th Infantry Division (light) Artillery at Fort Richardson, Alaska.*



by William Reese

# NEW SOLDIER TRAINING TOOL

Looking for an innovative training tool? I hope so. The MI soldier, perhaps more than soldiers in other branches, often needs to know very technical aspects of threat capabilities. The U.S. Army Intelligence Agency has developed a new means for MI soldiers to acquire and use scientific and technical threat data: the Personal Computer Query Tool (PCQT).

PCQT is a personal computer based product for viewing and querying information on certain weapon systems. The system consists of compiled data management programs and the parametric data files for which the Army Intelligence Agency is responsible. The data in the initial release has been entered by the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, Va. Subsequent releases will include Missile and Space Intelligence Center, Air Force and Navy data.

PCQT allows the MI soldier to view an individual weapon system, compare weapon systems side by side, produce spreadsheets of parametric data, and view graphics and comments related to a weapon system. The query capability will include searches for terms and parametric values. Spreadsheets can be built and saved for reuse later, merged to produce customized spreadsheets, or saved in American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) flat-file format to permit loading into word processing or other software.

PCQT is designed to be easy to use. On-line HELP is available from any point in the program. When HELP is selected, the information on using that particular part of the program will appear on the screen. A menu of HELP topics from which to select is also provided so that you can read about how to perform any function from any point in the program. However, with its window

menus, highlighted function keys, and choice of mouse or keyboard selection, the system is simple to use without much, if any, assistance. The PCQT software and data base structure provides great flexibility.


The PCQT includes an easy-to-install package developed and written by the Foreign Science and Technology Center and designed to run on a standard Zenith-248 with Intel 80286 microprocessor, one high-density floppy disk drive, a 40-megabyte hard disk, and a color monitor with EGA or VGA graphics card. Other configurations may also be possible since PCQT runs on any computer that runs DOS.

PCQT has been available since September 1989 to approved facilities and with approved document accounts. For further information concerning PCQT contact:

U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology  
Center  
ATTN: Plans and Operations  
220 Seventh Street, NE.  
Charlottesville, VA 22901-5396



Designator	Data Element Name	Data Element Value
GVNTH-64	MANUFACTURER'S DESIGNATION	640000
GVNTH-64	IOC DATE	1345-0-1-7
GVNTH-64	FORM	STANDARD
GVNTH-64	CURRENT STATUS	ANTIPERSONNEL
GVNTH-64	MINE TYPE	BLAST
GVNTH-64	MINE EFFECT	CYLINDRICAL
GVNTH-64	MINE SHAPE	
GVNTH-64	MINE LENGTH	
GVNTH-64	MINE WIDTH	
GVNTH-64	MINE HEIGHT	61
GVNTH-64	MINE DIAMETER-MMC	142
GVNTH-64	MINE DIAMETER-MIN	106
GVNTH-64	MINE WEIGHT	0.95
GVNTH-64	MINE EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT	0.21
GVNTH-64	MINE NONEXPLOSIVE WEIGHT	0.24



PCQT development at the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center was a team effort with William G. Reese as the Project Leader, George S. Goodwin as the Functional Representative, and Derek J. Trombley as the System Designer and Chief Programmer. Reese is the Chief, Applications Development Branch, Computer Services Division. He has a bachelor's degree from Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania. Goodwin is Chief, Engineer Branch, Combat Systems Division. He has a bachelor's degree from Virginia Military Institute and a master's degree from the Univ. of Virginia. Trombley is the microcomputer expert in the Information Center, Computer Services Division. He has an associate degree from Piedmont Virginia Community College.

## Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin Writer's Guide

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John Vance, editor

# PIONEER SPIRIT



by First Lieutenant John R. Mills

Our battlefield commanders have respected the value of aerial collection platforms since the War Between the States. In the century following "hot air balloon-INT," Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) have developed into an indispensable part of the intelligence business.

Today's rapidly shrinking Army (forces and resources) demands a hard look at our SEMA program.

**COST** — Airplanes and helicopters are expensive to buy, fly and maintain.

**CREW** — Pilot training is a lengthy and expensive proposition at best.

**RISK** — A commander in a high risk area must decide if he can afford to lose aircraft and crews in return for information. A difficult choice.

Logically what we need is an aerial collection platform that is relatively inexpensive, requires a shorter train-up period to operate, and can be operated with greater safety in high risk areas. The answer is the UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV).

Can a UAV perform all missions presently assigned to SEMA? NO. Of course not. On the other hand, the UAV can do some things unthinkable for SEMA. In order to continue this discussion, we need to look at specifics. The Army has chosen the Israeli-developed Pioneer system as the UAV it will take into battle.

## Pioneer System

The major elements of the Pioneer system are the air vehicle, a ground control station (GCS) in an S-280 shelter, a tracking control unit (TCU) in an S-250 shelter, a portable control station (PCS), and several major items of ground support equipment (GSE). The air vehicle itself has

a length of 14 feet, a wingspan of 17 feet, and a maximum takeoff weight of around 420 pounds. The total mission endurance is around two to four hours depending on the configuration of the air vehicle. The maximum range the Pioneer can fly down range from the GCS is 185 km although most safe mission profiles would be under 100 km. The land-based Pioneer can be launched by rocket assisted take-off (RATO), pneumatic catapult, or rolling take-off, but can only be landed on a runway.

## What The Pioneer Can Do For The Combat Arms

The Pioneer can play a critical role in all of the major phases of the battle. In movement to contact, the Pioneer will be able to scout ahead of the advancing forces, confirming or denying enemy activity in named areas of interest (NAIs). Cross-cuing between Pioneer and intelligence collectors (to include scouts) is an important capability. In a deliberate attack, the Pioneer will be able to perform a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's defensive structure. This will be invaluable in planning an attack on a prepared enemy force. In a hasty attack, if the Pioneer is in place, a prompt evaluation of the enemy's weaknesses and reinforcement posture is possible. During defensive operations a commander will be able to identify the massing of enemy forces and evaluate the possible enemy courses of action.

## UAV's Combat History

The Israelis' first combat use of a UAV was in the early 1980's in Lebanon in support of fixed wing airstrikes. They used the Mastiff to document and destroy the Syrian air defense system. According to one Israeli official, these tactics have been expanded and refined. No ground assault, raid, helicopter strike or fixed wing air



strike takes place without prior reconnaissance by a UAV.

The United States Navy gained a great deal of experience with the Pioneer while operating in the Persian Gulf. In 1987 and 1988 the battleship *Iowa* performed numerous Pioneer missions in support of the Joint Task Force Middle East. These included targeting, battle damage assessment, mine detection and combined operations with aircraft and helicopters.<sup>1</sup>

### Pioneer vs. Aquila

Whenever you mention UAVs, someone invariably brings up the Aquila. Pioneer differs in several ways from the Aquila system; in some ways it is a step backwards in technology. The Israeli systems were developed during roughly the same time period as the Aquila; however they took a much less technological approach to development. The air vehicle and the ground station were kept as simple as possible. There was no attempt to incorporate a laser designator into the Mastiff. Also, the autonomous capability of the Mastiff and the Pioneer is limited. These systems are basically designed to stay in constant contact with the ground and transmit live video. There is no provision for a recording capability on board the aircraft. The Aquila was designed for a pre-programmed launch and an autonomous flight, hence more complexity.

The Mastiff and the Pioneer have several launch options, but the land-based version is basically designed for a landing on a paved landing strip. Aquila can only be launched by catapult and landed in a vertical snare. Aquila was also looked at as a scaled-down aircraft or missile system, which required the expensive fixed assets in terms of facilities, production lines and engineering support from a major U.S. aerospace corporation. The Mastiff and the Pioneer are looked at as more of a scaled-up radio controlled aircraft. Since they are basically hand built, they may not benefit from the economies of scale that an assembly line could provide. They are not yet built in numbers that could justify a sophisticated assembly line.

### UAV Fielding This Year

The Army has chosen the UAV Platoon of the Aviation Training Support Company at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School to be its model UAV unit. The major FY 90 goal for the UAV platoon is to aggressively field the Pioneer in support of major Army exercises. The intent is

to fully integrate the Pioneer into existing Army operations and doctrine and not go through a long series of carefully controlled tests. The utility of the UAV and specifically the Pioneer has been shown by Israeli, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps use. The major event for FY 90 will be deployments of the UAV platoon to the National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, Calif.

The Platoon has five objectives for the NTC deployments.

1. Successful day/night missions. (Flying Pioneer regularly and successfully both day and night with minimal downtime for maintenance.)
2. Fly Pioneer over force on force engagements. (Flying Pioneer over a battle and during a battle to fully exploit its real-time intelligence gathering ability.)
3. Full integration of the Pioneer into the intelligence process. (Using Pioneer to fully synchronize the intelligence collection process. This should include cuing from other IEW systems and proper use of NAIs in mission planning.)
4. Fly two missions a day. (To provide the minimal support necessary for the supported units, two missions a day must be flown.)
5. Resolve air space management issues. (The Navy and Marine Corps conducted operations that have fully integrated helicopters, fixed wing and UAVs in close proximity to each other.)

The Pioneer fielding is the first step in what should be a major fielding of UAVs in the 1990's. The short range UAV competition should provide a UAV system to be fielded in mass to the Army by the mid 1990's. The MI brigades and major regional commands would be the initial recipients of this system. Funding permitting, these systems should be eventually found at the division level to synchronize the intelligence collection process. If the successful lead of the Navy and the Marine Corps can be followed, "the UAV will put MI on top of the battle!"

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*First Lieutenant John R. Mills is a 1987 graduate of the Univ. of Washington. In 1988, he completed the Officer Basic Course and became the UAV platoon leader. Mills has also completed the airborne and the psychological operations courses.*

## WORDS OF WISDOM

# *Changing Roles for MI in the 21st Century*

by Robert B. Davis

The Berlin Wall has crumbled, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Poland are democratizing, and untold wonders have taken place since I started to write this article. The only thing that seems to be constant and predictable is change. Because the details and implications of these events are increasingly difficult to analyze or predict, now is a good time to look at the direction the U.S. Army military intelligence will take in the 1990's and into the next century.

First, there are the assumptions. Assume, however tenuous it may sound, that Mikhail Gorbachev continues in power or is replaced by an even more reform-minded leader. Assume that the Eastern European countries continue to move away from communism. Assume that the proposed unilateral cuts in the size of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe are made, and assume that nothing else in the world changes.

What will be the role of military intelligence? If the number of U.S. divisions is cut, there will be fewer G2 and S2 organizations. But more importantly for the whole intelligence community, the threat will be redefined. This in turn will cause significant changes to take place at the intelligence support centers. For the past 45 years, notwithstanding the Korean and Viet Nam wars, the primary threat to U.S. ground forces has been the Warsaw Pact countries in general and the Soviet Union in particular. However, visions of Soviet soldiers storming through the Fulda Gap are now waning. Therefore, the primary focus of intelligence and force allocation for the U.S. Army may dramatically shift. This weakening of the "Fulda Fantasy" may prove to be a boon for Army intelligence analysts. It will allow us to concentrate on the things that have been realistic threats in the past and will likely

become the top issues for the next 20 years.

We may be finally realizing that full-scale military conflict between developed countries has become unreasonable because our economies are so intertwined. For example, most Western European countries have entered into a pact that will effectively dissolve their financial borders. Eastern European countries may eventually join this group or set up their own. To ensure peace and economic stability, numerous treaties will have to be kept in place. Work associated with monitoring military treaties will grow as force levels in Europe decrease.

But drug trafficking, terrorism and limited-intensity conflict are becoming prevalent and will call for more intelligence resources. The interdependence of these threats is growing as terrorist groups are financing their exploits through the sale of drugs. The drug cartels are using terrorism to control government officials, the press and the people. Armed conflicts associated with political terrorism and drug distribution will in turn escalate to the stage of small-scale wars. These interrelated threats to U.S. national security and the social fabric of our society will involve a significant slice of our intelligence assets and will divert those assets from the traditional study of large-scale conventional military conflicts.

The focus of military intelligence must therefore include an emphasis on treaty support, drug interdiction, terrorism and limited-intensity conflict. Recent events in Panama are an excellent example of how the issues of treaties, drugs, terrorism and limited-intensity conflict merge into this modern role of military intelligence. American involvement in Panama began with our early 20th century treaties. Other treaties negotiated by the Carter administration in the 1970's began turning the Panama canal over to the control of the Panamanian government. Then Manuel Nor-

iega stepped in with his drug trafficking and money laundering. When he began using terrorism against U.S. citizens, the diplomatic struggle was escalated to a limited-intensity conflict. Keeping this in mind, let's examine the four areas.

### **Treaty Support**

Treaties made in this age of high technology will be radically different from those that attempted to limit German rearmament between the World Wars. Because sophisticated means are available to monitor treaty compliance and the Soviets are for the first time willing to allow on-site inspections, the intelligence community can play an essential role in ensuring treaty compliance.

First, before treaties are signed, arms negotiators will need to be thoroughly informed about force levels and weapon system capabilities. To prevent technological surprise on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, intelligence experts will have to provide assessments of future threats that could arise from science and technology.

Next, inspectors and monitors must be made familiar with the sites and equipment they are examining. They must know, for example, whether a certain type of fertilizer plant could be quickly converted to manufacture chemical weapons or whether a self-propelled artillery system could be twice as effective as the towed system that it replaced. Such information will be key to force reduction tradeoffs, as well as to indications of rearmament.

The intelligence community will also play a greater role in the monitoring of transfers of military equipment and militarily critical technologies throughout the world. Treaties are intended to be stabilizing forces among nations, and the transfer of sophisticated technologies to non-treaty nations will threaten the relationship of trust and cooperation that is vital to keeping treaties viable. Western nations would take a dim view of the transfer of massive amounts of Soviet aging (but still lethal) surplus equipment to Nicaragua or the transfer of Soviet biological weapons technology to Syria.

### **Drug Interdiction**

Deaths from drug abuse and drug-related violence are the consequences of a civil war that is going on in the United States. Treating this problem as less than war by continuing to divide our forces in the face of the enemy, will ensure defeat.

Military intelligence has resources that can support the war on drugs. For example, Army, Navy and Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance personnel and equipment can be used to supplement Drug Enforcement Agency, Border Patrol and Coast Guard efforts.

Drug runners now employ the highest technology that money can buy. There are no budget constraints placed on the acquisition of weapons by the drug cartel. As the U.S. government escalates its interdiction program, the drug cartels will buy the best systems to defeat these efforts. Faster ships and aircraft will be equipped with the most advanced radars and radar detection and jamming subsystems. Nap-of-the-earth autopilots and sophisticated navigation will likely be used. Drug interdiction forces could face the latest air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, along with a wide array of other expensive weapons.

We must therefore keep abreast of these acquisitions, as well as methods of negating their threat. The fact that much of this equipment can be obtained on the commercial market or through clandestine sources will make the job of estimating the drug cartel's technological sophistication a formidable one.

### **Terrorism**

In the past 20 years, the world has experienced an upsurge of terrorism more brutal than the acts that served as the catalysts for World War I. The tactics of terrorism have evolved with the advent of mass communication networks and sophisticated security systems. The refinements result from a realization that modern-day terrorism is a psychological operation. Political assassinations still take place, but today, rather than target relatively well-protected Western heads of state or other high-profile personnel, terrorists prey on highly vulnerable targets. The terrorists' goal is to undermine the state by showing its citizens that the legitimate government cannot effectively provide for their safety. Terrorist attacks are also arranged to create the biggest "splash" in the press.

The airline industry has been a traditional victim. With a small amount of explosive, terrorists can bring down an airplane, kill large numbers of people, and escape undetected among the thousands of passengers milling about a terminal. The press, which lingers over such catastrophes, becomes the second victim of the terrorists' plot.

By constantly bombarding the public with sen-

sational accounts of terrorist acts, the press will eventually desensitize the public to the horror of these acts. The result will be the need to kill increasingly larger numbers of people (whole cities perhaps) or more spectacular targets (military posts). To do this, new weapons will have to be added to the terrorists' arsenal. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will provide the shocking lethality necessary to intimidate the world. Even by attempting to use these weapons, successfully or not, the terrorists will achieve their goal of instilling fear and doubt.

As with drug interdiction, the military intelligence community will become invaluable in the struggle against terrorism. In addition, military intelligence specialists who monitor training, logistics and mobility issues could predict terrorist acts and tactics. Monitoring the transfer of various technologies to countries that support and supply terrorists will be indispensable in predicting when these groups could surprise us with the latest refinement of their deadly craft.

#### **Limited-Intensity Conflict**

It has been called low intensity combat and a variety of other names used to label armed confrontation with a sociopolitical rather than a strictly military objective. Compared to the fighting in World War II, acts of revolution might easily be called "low intensity conflict." But from the perspective of a Central American soldier fighting in the streets of San Salvador, the intensity level is anything but low. In many cases, this soldier's clash is more like antiterrorism than full combat against another country's soldier.

Limited-intensity conflicts are usually started by groups who feel oppressed by the existing government. The escalation of the conflict moves through terrorist-type acts to small-scale combat. The level of combat these insurgents commit themselves to is restricted by the number of casualties they are willing to take in relation to the sociopolitical impact of that combat. Also, like terrorists, their first objective is to erode the people's trust in the government's ability to ensure the safety of its citizens. Once this seed of doubt takes root, the conflict can turn to undermining

the other ties that bind a government to its citizens.

As I said before, drug lords, terrorists and revolutionaries share the same tactics and economic base, thereby forging a formidable alliance. These groups use violence to instill fear to control and manipulate peoples and governments. Fear causes local police and military officials to turn a blind eye to the drug industry in their own countries. In El Salvador, the *Farabundo Marti Frente Nacional* insurgents cause fear in local officials and villagers by summary executions. In many cases large bribes help these officials to rationalize ignoring the law. Fear of terrorist reprisals shapes the internal and international policies of even strong nations (for example, the refusal of the French government to allow U.S. overflight during the 1986 raid on Libya).

Limited-intensity conflicts require the use of special operations and light, highly mobile conventional units. These forces' intelligence needs will be unique and will demand that many intelligence specialists broaden their perspective.

First, intelligence analysts must gain an appreciation of the places where the United States may enter into limited-intensity conflicts. In the past, intelligence experts in tactics, doctrine, science or technology could single-mindedly ply their trades and remain aloof from the surrounding sociopolitical framework. Today and in the future the context of that expertise will become as vital as the specialized information. In addition to requests for the technical parameters of an explosive, intelligence specialists may be asked whether it could be concealed if particle sensing becomes cheap enough to be placed in Third World airports, or whether an illiterate peasant could be trained to handle and successfully detonate it.

American chauvinism is our greatest handicap when it comes to understanding the culture of countries where we might find ourselves in a limited-intensity conflict. We as a country do not have the answers to all the problems of the world and are not the ideal model for every nation. Without an in-depth grasp of a country's culture, our intelligence processes and assessments will be fault ridden. More force than necessary may

*The use of military force in a limited-intensity conflict is as narrow as possible, whereas the role of intelligence is all-encompassing.*



be applied in a sensitive situation. News reports may be presented in a manner that offends the people we are trying to befriend. Some of our military efforts may result in a wiser and more vicious enemy. The changes taking place in the world provide an opportunity for military intelligence to adapt and thrive, but innovation and versatility will be required rather than narrow specialization.

## Conclusion

Intelligence still has vital roles to play. In the area of treaty monitoring, international agreements are being examined for adaptation to the changing international political and economic climate of today. In the West the dual forces of governments, with their political concerns, and industries, with their economic goals, contribute to the need for adaptable agreements. Additionally, like in the U.S.S.R., other countries are beset with internal ideological struggles. As each of these forces moderate or strengthen, treaties will have to be modified to suit the new environment.

Many existing treaties will continue for the foreseeable future. Neither side will want to immediately trust the other. However, at some point we expect that the olive branch will be extended, and a streamlining process will take place. Lower priority technologies on the Militarily Critical Technologies List will gradually be dropped from the embargo lists. These shifts will come through battles between factions supporting defense, other government interests and industry. The amount of influence of each will depend on the internal political climate of the country. (For example, up to now government interests have played a dominant role in the United States, whereas in the Federal Republic of Germany industry dominates.)

The tasks of intelligence experts will be more difficult and yet more important in light of the rapidly changing political environment and the lack of trust between nations resulting from decades of broken treaties, international tension and ideological disagreements. Agreements in which the United States participates will be negotiated based on input from the Departments of State and Commerce, DOD trade security, military and national-level intelligence, and industry. The degree to which we establish and/or modify treaties must depend on our knowledge of the implications of past and proposed changes. It is essential, therefore, that treaty changes be modulated by feedback from intelligence reviews.

The second vital role for intelligence is in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. The most ominous danger to world peace is that the limited-intensity conflicts generated by terrorists or drug lords may act as a catalyst for a major military conflict between First World Nations. For example, "flagging" of Colombian drug ships as Cuban commercial vessels could result in an international confrontation between Cuba and the United States if one of these boats were to be seized. Such a confrontation might then draw in Nicaragua and the Soviet Union.

As the weapons, tactics and goals of terrorists and the drug cartels mix and escalate into limited-intensity conflicts, the efforts of military intelligence, the CIA and the FBI must become synchronized and well coordinated. Intelligence feudalism will result in an impairment of our ability to address these vital national security issues. We must strive for the strength of purpose our country had during World War II. While the enemies may not be as clearly defined and our intelligence mission may seem more like police detective work, we must act as if we were at war — **because we are!**

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# Warfighting and Intelligence in the 21st Century:

## *Promote the Best Officers!*

by Colonel Joseph M. Blair III

The officers we promote this decade will be the **action officers** responsible for intelligence support to war planning, training and fighting in the 21st century. In light of our rapidly shrinking forces and resources, it is **critical** that we promote only the best.

There are three elements in each promotion: the officer to be promoted, the raters and senior raters who write evaluations, and the promotion board itself. I will discuss the impact of each in turn, drawing from my experiences on two recent promotion boards and 25 years working to promote the best for our Army.

First a word of warning. We, as raters and senior raters must first accurately identify those MI officers who **should** be promoted. We must discriminate between who is **best**, who is **good**, who is **average**, who is **below average** and who is definitely **not promotable**. If we don't have the **moral courage** to do this, what I'm telling you will be pointless and will inflate the rating system. Be responsible raters and senior raters. Understand that we need only a few generals, a few more colonels, lots of majors, even more captains and tons of lieutenants.

Having established that we must promote only the best; an understanding of **how** the process

works will help us do that. Let's look first at the promotion board: how it's put together and how the promoters actually do their business.

### The Board

The Department of the Army selects promotion boards so that all branches and populations are represented. Boards are balanced and not weighted toward any branch or group. This is not to say that board members don't bring their personal biases from their backgrounds and experiences. The senior officers on the board have been successful in their Army careers. They tend to promote those "molded in their image." Hopefully, more board members will look to the requirements of the future and, in appropriate cases, break the "mold."

### How the Board Works

The mission of a promotion board is to rank the prospective promotees in numerical order from most to least qualified and, based on the needs and budget of the Army, **promote** a certain number of them.

The entire career of a hopeful officer is represented in a simple file. This file should contain three items: a hard copy DA photo, an officer record brief (ORB) and a microfiche that contains

performance information, evaluation reports (OERs). I'll discuss the file contents in a moment, but first let's continue about the way the board works.

In a typical board, there might be 21 members. The members are divided into three panels. In the interest of fairness, each panel works independently in its own board room. This reduces the chance that any one member could dominate the proceedings and acts as a check and quality assurance across panels.

### Voting Procedures

Each board member votes on each file, assigning each file a number from -1 to +6 with +6 being the highest score. He sees only his vote — none of the others. You may be surprised to learn that these blind votes are usually the same or within one number rating of each other. The system is very fair in this regard. If, on a rare occasion, one member is way out of line with the vote, the panel recorder asks that member to look again at the file. The files are rotated randomly among individuals and panels. The purpose here is to increase fairness.

### How Board Members Look at the File

The first board member to review a file is responsible for screening the complimentary and disciplinary data in that file. In reality, he primarily checks for disciplinary data. If a file contains a letter of reprimand or an Article 15, the first reviewer notes it on a comment sheet for following board members to see. This type of data in the 90's will most likely result in **non-promotion**.

### DA Photo

A picture IS worth a thousand words! The hard copy photo is what board members see first. It is your introduction to the board — make it a good one. Don't look fat. Fat officers do not get promoted. Shoes, uniform, haircut — anything less than perfect is not good enough. If you **must** wear a mustache, trim it to regulation. Appearance isn't everything, but what kind of officer **intentionally chooses** to make a bad first impression? One more word about pictures and then I'll move on. Wear your MI brass — not GS.

## Accurate, Up-To-Date Officer Record Brief (ORB) is Very Important

In a recent board, the members used the ORB primarily to determine an officer's Military Education Level (MEL) and confirm weight and height data listed on OERs. If the ORB does not correctly reflect these critical discriminators, the result could be a non-select. This may be a reason to write a letter to the president of the board. However, such additions to the file are called "loose paper" and generally should be avoided.

Loose paper places an extra burden on board members. They must take precious limited time to read through it. Recent or late OERs are fine, but impact awards, letters of appreciation, graduate school grades and the like only frustrate board members and bog down the selection process. I recommend a clean, crisp, concise file that paints a clear picture of the officer. Except for those things which clearly indicate you have significantly improved your qualification or explain something in your file which could otherwise detract, **avoid loose paper!**

## OERs - The Bottom Line

Certainly, everything I've talked about up to now is important, but the real meat of the promotion matter boils down to OERs. Simply put, the OERs on an officer's performance microfiche can make or break a promotion. Board members are looking for **trends** over time. Trends that continue through several different raters and senior raters stand out. Because boards have a limited time to review each file, they do not have time to read every word of each OER. **How**, then, can a rater and senior rater write OERs that have a powerful impact under these circumstances? The senior rater is the key here. He **must know** his officers, and write strong, unmistakable words to describe their performance.

### How to Write an OER that Matters

The senior rater profile carries the most weight. This powerful tool, if used correctly, allows senior raters to boost our very best. I witnessed too many senior raters diminish their ratings by sending an unclear message to the board. If a senior rater "top blocks" the vast majority of

his officers, the board will have to look for other performance indicators — something they may not have time to do.

POTENTIAL EVALUATION (See Chapter 3, 10-622-100)

SR		DA USE ONLY HI 25 2 LO	

A COMPLETED DA FORM 67-8-1 WAS RECEIVED WITH THIS REPORT AND CONSIDERED IN MY EVALUATION AND REVIEW

☒ YES ☐ NO (Explain in hi)

What does this Senior Rater's profile tell you about this officer's promotion potential? How does he stack up against the others rated by this senior rater?

The words used in key places are the next most important thing. The new Army Writing style is the answer. Don't write too much. Don't fill all the space in narratives. Concise, direct and simple statements are much more powerful. Boards won't read all your wonderful prose and poetry. **Never Be Subtle.**

### To Promote MI Officers We Must Talk in WARFIGHTING TERMS

I told you earlier that the Army selects board members to represent a cross section of the Army. In other words, MI officers will be promoted based on the perceptions of other than MI officers. It is our responsibility to present ourselves to the rest of the Army in terms they understand and value. We must emphasize how our jobs relate to supporting commanders through operations and training. That is **fighting or getting ready to fight.**

Begin the "warfighter" presentation of an MI soldier with the **job title.** This is more important than job description because time may preclude reading the job description. Titles that carry weight are **commander, operations officer,**

**S2, S3 and XO.** Job descriptions are only important if board members aren't familiar with a specific job. Keep in mind that board members need to understand how a job relates to warfighting.

### The Power of the Senior Rater

The senior rater's words must be simple and powerful to make any impact on a board member. The **first and last** sentences in the rater's potential block and the senior rater's narrative are most important. Raters and senior raters must make an impact in those two sentences. For example, if a rater says "select immediately for battalion command followed by selection as a division G2" it will carry more weight to a board member than "select for G2" alone.

The same idea of pairing intelligence officers (G2/S2) with command applies at the captain level. Writing "Select immediately for S2 duties with a combined arms brigade" is not as powerful as "Select immediately for the toughest company command followed by S2 of a brigade."

The gravest disservice a senior rater can do for an officer is to dismiss his obligation on an OER by writing "I concur with the rater." Say what you mean. "Promote ahead. Select early for battalion command. Select immediately for senior service college. An early selectee for colonel. A future general officer." This kind of writing will prevent the board from having to guess what you mean or, worse yet, assuming that your lack of effort means you don't want your officer promoted.

### Promotion in the 21st Century

The Army's promotion process is a fair means of evaluating a large number of officers very quickly. It assumes that officers do difficult jobs very well. It requires that officers meet standards — height, weight and PT. Those of us who evaluate MI officers must do so with an eye to the coming century. We need to promote our best and brightest — powerful, hard-hitting OERs will do that.

*Colonel Joseph M. Blair III is the commander of the 111th Military Intelligence Brigade (Training), U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He will be the next G2 for III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas.*



# An Attack on "Detail"

by Captain Richard Wiersema

One of the most overused phrases in the Army, ranking right up there with "good to go," is "attention to detail." Worse than its overuse is the evil influence it has on all aspects of our work, whether in the day room or the war room. We are advised from the moment we sign on not to let the smallest detail of our duties escape us. We are told that our failures result from weak planning, poor research or overlooked problems. But, we are wrong to put this much faith in details.

True, there is such a thing as poor attention to detail. We all know this. Ignorance is lethal. We should remember Winston Churchill's response to

the feeble notion that familiarity breeds contempt. "I should like to remind you," he said, "that without a degree of familiarity, we couldn't breed anything."<sup>1</sup>

I couldn't agree more. The amount of unfamiliarity out there in the Real Army is staggering. Once, when I was briefing a threat summary to a staff colonel he interrupted me with the question, "Lieutenant, what are Balkans?" When I moved to the map to reply, my commander cut me off. "Don't shoot from the hip," he told me. He then told the colonel I would look the question up for him. Later, at my commander's order, I submitted a written answer to the colonel's question, which the chain of command reviewed for signs of hip-shooting. I included in the answer not only the



origin of the word Balkan (from the Old English *balca*, "a barrier", if you're curious) but also the sources I used in researching the matter. The security officer asked me before releasing it if the information was classified!

This incident is not exaggerated and it is not unique. It includes the problems both of poor "familiarity" and obsessive attention to detail. I do not think knowing what and where the Balkans are is asking too much of any serving officer. Yet, the amount of worrying that went into answering the question far exceeded the value of the answer itself. "Attention to detail" meant taking absurd measures to ensure the validity of a simple fact.

It is worry, or uncertainty, that gives us our obsession with detail. We over plan out of fear that we will forget the one tidbit that will destroy us. We agonize over war plans, exercise plans, showdown inspections and Inspector General visits. We believe that we can weed out all of the offending vague orders, unwashed latrines, worn track pads and unfilled forms. We worry like this to ease our minds. We even have a catchy alliteration — "prior planning prevents p--- poor performance" — with which to batter our soldiers if they complain about counting the hairs on the elephant's nose for the 300th time!

I'm not against counting things or planning things with care. I was a property book officer for 10 months and I fully appreciate the need to know where things are. I've been in strategic and tactical units as an executive officer, platoon leader and primary staff officer, and I've seen the grief that comes from shoddy planning and ignorance in action. If I learned anything, it is that something always gets left out. But, this is not always a crisis. Common sense tells us that some things are more important than others. But listen, read, look around you. We do not always heed this common sense. My commanders, echoing their commanders, all have smiled sadly at me and said: "You never catch all the mistakes. There's always something to be done."

If you're convinced that success comes from crossing every "t" and dotting every "i," that's good advice. However, we've made micromanagement into a way of life. Like greatness, some come to this style of management naturally, others have it thrust upon them. We've written volumes of SOPs, letters of instruction and memoranda for record, some or all of which require more attention to detail in their proof reading. Most amazing, absurd and alarming of all, if I might alliterate myself, is the proliferation of pri-

orities. I once counted 16 "number one priority" letters sent out from the same general officer headquarters (this while on staff duty, when no doubt I should have been paying attention to detail somewhere else).

I think it is those 16 "number one priorities" which best illustrate the lurking evil of "attention to detail." If we believe that the smallest errors will kill us, that every flaw is a potential disaster, then everything — serial numbers, safety briefings, wooden built-up trailers, pregnant dependents, vehicle dispatches, nuclear surety, gate guard rosters, march tables and mess kits — becomes a screaming priority. The danger is clear. We agree that what is important requires attention. If I ask you what is important, and you tell me everything is important, then everything deserves equal and exhaustive attention, and you haven't answered my question.

Fine, you say, if "attention to detail" is so evil, then what about that nail, for want of which the battle was lost? What about the stoves that weren't packed on REFREEZER 85? What about those little things that you have to count when you inventory big things? What about that letter sent to the CG in which his first name was spelled with an "a" instead of an "e"?

They aren't important. No battle ever was lost because a unit was short one nail. If the plan was that dependent on the regimental blacksmith, then the S3 was an idiot. This is a bigger problem than a missing nail. If we believe the truest test of military efficiency is keeping track of double pedestal desks and correcting letters to generals, let's recruit only accountants and typists. If we believe that massive detail will allay fears and overcome doubt, then we are lost. We are taking counsel of our fears, as Stonewall Jackson noted. "Attention to detail" has become "attention to EVERY detail." As a result, a commander's career rides on his ability to count widgets, a staffer's competence on his knowledge of obscure procedure and regulations. We have forgotten that a priority is just that. There can be only one number one.

The problem is not unique to commander's inventories and staff papers. It shows up in intelligence estimates with disturbing, if painstaking, regularity. It does not matter if the estimate is written at national or brigade level. The features remain the same. The terrorist groups are all listed by their alphabet soup names (we need a modern-day Linnaeus of national security to name them in Latin). The ground gets an exhaustive

physical which includes the depth of the streams, the density of the woods and the height of the hills. Is there a more useless statistic than "average elevation"? We list every known unit in the enemy's ranks, whether a tank battalion or a bakery company. We sum up the enemy commander's personality: he is "aggressive," or "traditional." We intend by these measures to account for every scrap of information we have about the battlefield and the enemy. We are overcompensating for doubt.

In the 1920's, a German physicist named Werner Heisenberg made a discovery about light. He was trying to predict the behavior of light particles, arguably the smallest level of detail possible. Briefly, he discovered that "the more accurately you measure the position of a particle, the less accurately you measure its speed, and vice versa."<sup>2</sup> It seems you can only measure light with light, and that the behavior of the measuring light affects the behavior of the measured light so that the data will always be inaccurate. The result was Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, "a fundamental, inescapable property of the world."<sup>3</sup> Remember Heisenberg the next time you get set to write "a motor rifle division will do X when attacking against a defending enemy." Remember Heisenberg when you are told to inventory your sets, kits and outfits. There is no more concise rebuttal to the belief that details give us certainty.

We have made a military virtue of pickiness. In the name of careful thought and planning we are told to count the grains of sand on a beach. I don't think we should stop checking up on our subordinates, or counting our widgets, or measuring our battlefields. We must know how to inspect rigorously. But we have to ask why, and we have to ask the question ruthlessly. We need to edit our attention to detail as we do our Effective Army Writing.

One parting shot, before I go back to filling in dots on multiple choice tests. Too much attention to detail wears out your brain. Not only do you have to read more junk, but the junk starts to compete with the important stuff for space.

When I was a second lieutenant, keenly observant and not yet cynical, I noticed that all U.S. officers on the NATO staff where I worked carried large black binders, which they called "brain books." With more instinct to conform than thought, I started to carry one myself. I was told, as I think most of us are, that I had to write everything down, that commander's aren't sure

you've got it unless they see you put it on paper. This is a useful exercise for schoolchildren, but as professional advice for line officers, it stinks.

A British colonel asked me one day why I felt it necessary to carry my brain in a book. He picked up the book and asked me to tell him what was in it. I was surprised to find that I could tell such important details as the days I had to give briefings, when my soldiers had promotion boards, and the phone numbers for the staff sections I worked with, etc. He handed the book back to me and said he was relieved to know that at least some of my brain had remained in my head.

Writing everything down is another symptom of too much attention to detail, of trying to measure that particle of light. Those little black notebooks are the worst kind of crutch. They are the result of the belief in good faith that mastery of detail is the key to success. Each of us has a memory and exercising it is as essential as exercising the body. If we encourage the little black notebooks we might as well allow soldiers to use bicycles on the two mile run. If we are required, or if we require ourselves, to scribble down every bit of information, then the mind will be weakened. We will have put our trust in paper and not in ourselves.

In the past three years I have been a property book officer, a technical control and analysis section chief, a platoon leader, and S2 of a cavalry squadron on the West German border. I did not use a little black notebook, except when my commander required it. Maybe this is proof that anyone can make captain. Maybe not.

#### Footnotes

1. Clifton Fadiman, ed., *The Little, Brown Book of Anecdotes* (Boston, 1985) p. 123.\*
2. Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time* (New York, 1988) p. 55.
3. Ibid.

\*This book is in fact large and green.

*Captain Richard Wiersema was commissioned from the College of William and Mary. He has served in the Middle East and West Germany. After graduation from the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course he will be assigned to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.*

# PROFESSIONAL READING

**America's Secret Army** by Ian Sayer and Douglas Botting, New York: Franklin Watts, 1989, 372 pages, \$22.95.

**America's Secret Army** is a detailed and fast-paced book that gives the reader a fascinating account of American counterespionage activities on a global scale during World War II. Anyone interested in the secret side of World War II and the men who played a vital role in covert activities won't be disappointed.

When Americans think of our espionage services, the first name that comes to mind is the CIA. That covert body was formed in 1947 by an executive order signed by President Harry Truman to replace the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that performed so boldly during World War II.

But another super-secret counterintelligence agency existed before World War II and continued to operate as America became involved in the war against both Japan and Germany.

The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) worked in conjunction with the OSS in all major theaters of the war. The daring activities of the CIC, an agency not really known to most Americans, is described in rich detail in this book. Using newly declassified CIC archives and

interviews with many surviving CIC agents, the authors provide a thorough account of the CIC and the men and the missions they performed. They describe the rise of the American intelligence establishment in the years before Pearl Harbor from the Corps of Intelligence in World War I to the birth of the CIC.

The principal duty of the CIC was counterintelligence activities against America's enemies. CIC agents were responsible for security over American planes on the ground, ships in port and the sprawling military bases both at home and abroad.

During World War II, the CIC operated alongside regular Army combat troops in Europe, North Africa, China, the Middle East and the Pacific. They provided cover for the supplies heading over the "Hump" to the China-India-Burma theater; protected strategically important Iceland, the jumping off point for American supplies heading for Europe; and tracked down Nazi espionage agents in South America, etc.

The authors give a detailed account of the type of men recruited by the CIC. Whether they were officers or enlisted men each man had to have a college degree and an IQ of at least 120. As the war progressed, these well educated CIC agents joined Regular

Army units as they waded ashore on D-Day, in Italy and in the other important operations of the war.

However, the Regular Army commanders did not trust these elite CIC men who lived in better quarters and ate better rations than their own men.

The most interesting aspect of **America's Secret Army** is the authors' description of the CIC's role in two of the most important military missions of the war; the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb and the D-Day invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. Other aspects of **America's Secret Army** cover the CIC's involvement in important campaigns in Italy, Japan, the Middle East and the massive CIC hunt for ex-Nazis in Germany after the end of the war.

The book is full of CIC adventures against the Germans, Russians, Poles and other East-Bloc nations in the so-called "cold war" period. But to me the most interesting and disturbing aspect of the book is the account of Klaus Barbie, the infamous "Butcher of Lyon" and his relationship with American Army intelligence after the war. In the Barbie case, the CIC was overruled by the top military leaders who, despite their knowledge of Barbie's Nazi past, continued to use him as an intelligence "asset."



In the book's appendix there is a detailed account of the Barbie affair by Colonel (Ret.) Earl Browning who played a major role in the Barbie controversy.

**Peter Kross**  
North Brunswick, N.J.

**Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare** by Donald J. Hanle, Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989, 254 pages, \$32.00.

Hanle's goal in writing this book was threefold. First, he wanted to write a scholarly work examining military aspects of terrorism. Second, he wanted to confirm the belief that terrorism is a form of war. The final goal was to propose appropriate responses to counter those types of terrorism that qualify as a form of war.

The author did achieve all three goals. Unfortunately, the first half of the book is not nearly as good as the second half. The second half, dealing directly with terrorism, is clear and concise. The examples illustrate the main points as well.

**Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare** is the first volume of Pergamon-Brassey's terrorism series. The book serves as a good introduction to terrorism. It explores the question of whether or not terrorism is a form of war.

The first half of the book defines the terms of how to understand war. Here the author examines the different approaches to the study of war and of the other factors which form the concept known as war. He then creates a model that can determine whether certain types of terrorism qualify as being a form of war.

The model asks three basic questions. The first asks whether or not the activity involves lethal force by a political entity for a political end. Next, does the activity include employing lethal force against the cohesion of the targeted political entity? Finally, do both sides use lethal force under the author's principles of combat?

The second half of the book deals directly with terrorism. Here the author examines a variety of types of terrorism: psychotic, criminal, mystical, revolutionary, repression, military and state-sponsored. He applies the model to each to see if the type of terrorism qualifies as a form of war. According to the author, only revolutionary, military and state-sponsored terrorism qualify as forms of war. The final chapters of the book deal with counterterrorism.

As I said, the first half of the book, unfortunately, is not nearly as clear nor as concise as the second half. The first half will give the reader a good understanding of how the author created a model for defining war. The summaries found at the end of each chapter do help clarify the main points.

Readers who have studied the subject before might wish to only read the chapter summaries in the first half to get to the second half quicker. It is the second half of the book that makes it worth reading. This work will serve as a good base for later works on the subject.

**Second Lieutenant Drew Swank**  
204th MI Battalion, Augsburg, Germany

**Disaster in Korea** by Lieutenant Colonel Roy Appleman,

College Station, Texas: Texas A & M Univ. Press, 1989, 456 pages, \$34.95.

Appleman's account of the performance of the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment is subject to question. He details many of the regiments failures in combat but does not hold the predominantly white chain-of-command accountable, not does he convincingly show that the 24th's performance was significantly worse than that of other units in the Eighth Army. Most striking is the lack of postwar interviews with former members of the regiment. One of the great strengths of **Disaster in Korea** is the postwar research, letters and interviews Appleman conducted in order to tell the full story. The failure to include 24th Infantry Regiment veterans in the postwar interview process is a glaring error of omission that mars this otherwise fine book.

This book is the first full-length account of the defeat of the Eighth Army by the first Chinese Communist offensive of the Korean War in 1950. Appleman is also the author of **South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu**, the official Army history of the early months of the war and **East of Chosin**, which details the events in the X Corps sector to the east of the Eighth Army.

**Disaster in Korea** begins with the horrific intelligence failure to discover the Communist Chinese entry into the war. This failure was present at all levels, from MacArthur's headquarters all the way down to the battalion S2 shops. The Chinese achieved total strategic and tactical surprise in their attack.

Appleman describes the

Eighth Army's retreat out of North Korea as more of a "bug out" than a fighting withdrawal and states the specific leadership and training weaknesses that caused this to happen. His account of the 2d Infantry Division's retreat from *Kunu-ri* is one of triumph and tragedy. **Disaster in Korea** is far superior to S.L.A. Marshall's episodic **The River and the Gauntlet** and should be regarded as the authoritative source.

**Captain David Taggart**  
Fort Benning, Ga.

**Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia** edited by Bialer and Seweryn, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989, 241 pages, \$28.50 and \$13.95 paperback.

Overall, this book is scholarly, very well written and easy to understand. The bibliographical references throughout the book are extremely useful. I highly recommend it to anyone who is interested in the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union today.

This fascinating book presents seven articles which deal with problems facing Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. The articles collectively compare the Soviet leaders since Stalin and analyze Gorbachev's reforms in the light of the experiences of earlier heads of the Soviet government. The six authors are among the leading Soviet scholars in the United States and Great Britain today. They all arrive at essentially the same conclusion — Gorbachev is heading in the right direction, but he will have some severe problems.

Gorbachev's economic and

political reforms should be quite beneficial within the Soviet Union. A distinct easing of economic constraints, along with the increased role for the workers in all aspects of society, should serve to improve productivity and distribution. These two perennial Soviet problems will show to the general public the advantages of supporting their new leader.

Political change is also a foundation of Gorbachev's reform plan. He wants to dramatically broaden the base of political power in the Soviet Union. This part of the plan, by introducing more people to the true nature of politics, requires increased political freedom and increased freedom of the press.

Both routes to Gorbachev's reforms can lead to serious domestic problems. These problems have already started; strikes, race riots and massive public political demonstrations have been severe this last summer. These are problems the Soviet people are not accustomed to facing. The authors agree that Gorbachev's greatest challenge will be to convince the people and the current political leaders that the problems created by the new reforms will be worth the trouble in the long run. Can the Soviet people, after so many years of political repression, authoritarian government, economic restrictions and careful social control by the state police, make the change to greater freedom, responsibility and knowledge of the world around them?

The writers state very clearly that they feel reform is making progress. They also clearly state that they support that reform 100 percent. After a serious discussion of the problems and challenges Gorbachev faces,

there is too much that Gorbachev is trying to change to make predictions of any value.

**Captain Robert D. McMichael**  
Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.

**Maverick Marine** by Hans Schmidt, Lexington, Ky.: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1987, 292 pages, \$28.00.

Have you ever wondered why South and Central Americans mistrust the United States? What causes them to have such a deep-rooted fear of U.S. intervention in the national affairs? Read this book and you will begin to understand the ill will that foreign intervention creates and why. You will find out how we used the military to protect and further our business interest in such countries as Haiti, Nicaragua and China.

General Smedley D. Butler was on the cutting edge of almost all of our international meddling between 1900 and 1930. But, what about Butler, the man, the military leader? After reading this book, I still feel he is an enigma. He was launched, without real qualifications, on a military career through the influence of his father, a powerful member of Congress. He turned out to be a brave and fearless combat soldier. I detect, however, that he was not basically a good leader of men. His drive to build his public image and to be noticed must have been at the expense of his men. Leaving his men sweltering on the beach in the Philippines, while he moved out to the comfort of quarters on a naval vessel with the top brass, somewhat substantiates this.

As he moved up in rank, he became an outspoken center of controversy in the Marine



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Corps. He attacked the non-combat Marine Corps staff officers, apparently in an effort to push himself past them into the commandant's seat. Yet, at the same time, in his other activities he gave the Marine Corps lots of positive publicity and good press.

His father's powerful position seems to have protected Butler throughout most of his career and allowed him to be outspoken and political. When his father died, Butler's career in the Marine Corps faded and he retired. This didn't stop him, however, from going on to become a very controversial national figure in the public eye.

I recommend this book mainly so that the reader can form his or her own opinion of this very controversial military man. Was he really a very clever, self-centered officer who, in attempting to further his own career, helped the Marine Corps in its efforts to keep from being swallowed up by the Navy? Or was he truly a hero and brilliant leader who put his men and service before his own interests?

**Lieutenant Colonel Tom. W. Williams (USMC Ret.)**  
Sierra Vista, Ariz.

**Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army** by George C. Wilson, N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, 276 pages, \$19.95.

Army authorities are sometimes overly sensitive to real or perceived criticism. Some even prefer not to tell it like it is. On the other hand, in his book, **Mud Soldiers**, George Wilson insisted on interview after interview — check after check

— to find and record the real world. His book is well worth reading by all concerned with today's Army.

The first chapter of this book gives the most complete, accurate and vivid account of a rifle company battle in Vietnam that I have ever read. The unit was Company C, 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry; the battle took place in April 1966 when the company, then with only 134 men, took on the 400 men of the D-800 Viet Cong battalion.

When relief finally arrived after some 18 hours of desperate fighting, Company C could count only 28 unwounded or slightly wounded men. It had also earned the Army's Valorous Unit award the hard way.

Wilson, the military correspondent for the Washington Post, then jumps from Vietnam to Fort Benning, July 1987. In his next six chapters he describes the challenges of basic and advanced individual training that faced 66 newly enlisted soldiers, a COHORT group that would become a part of the new Company C, then at Fort Riley, still a part of the 1st Infantry Division and the 16th Infantry.

Wilson spent a considerable amount of time with those new soldiers, and his description of the training is the next best thing to experiencing those very tough days. Unhappily, when the 66 soldiers did reach Fort Riley, they soon learned that soldiering there and at the National Training Center was different; it was mainly unexciting, even monotonous.

The author returned to Riley one year later to check on the 66 soldiers he had known at Benning. By then, 12 had been discharged or were about to be discharged for various reasons. The young married soldiers who

were living in shabby trailer camps were especially disillusioned. And so the book's second and third segments reveal certain Army activities that can and should be improved. These areas certainly merit study, analysis and corrective action.

**Major General Albert H. Smith, Jr.**  
U. S. Army Retired  
Tucson, Ariz.

*Editor's Note: At the present time we are fortunate in having a large number of excellent book reviews on hand. In order to bring these reviews to you in a timely manner, over the next two issues we will provide you with a list of some of these books and the reviewers comments. If you would like a copy of the complete review please write me here at the Bulletin and I will see that you get a copy.*

**Captain John F. Beck, Ft. Devens, Mass**

**The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Comparative Dimensions, Volume II** edited by Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987. "The authors go far beyond simple bilateral superpower based or anticolonial explanations. Though at times highly academic in nature, this book is well worth reading as it addresses the most likely battlefield for both the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the twentieth century."

**Major William H. Burgess III, Fayetteville, N.C.**  
**The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear**



**Dilemmas and Asian Security** edited by Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1986, 301 pages. "Overall, this book is of practically no relevance to special operations or intelligence personnel concerned with the Far East. It does have several good thought pieces for narrow academic audiences, beyond which the book is not worth buying."

**Intelligence and Strategic Surprises** by Ariel Levite, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 220 pages, \$27.50. The worst thing that can be said of Levite's effort is that his book is very dry, tough reading in several sketches and that his \$27.50 price tag is too steep for most intelligence soldiers to afford. The book's import is, however, comparable to Kahn's *The Codebreakers* and Wohlstetter's *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*. In its hardcover form, however, the book still deserves a place in major intelligence libraries."

**Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, 2d Edition** by Cheah Boon Kheng, Singapore: Singapore Univ. Press, 1987, 336 pages, \$19.95. "This book is useful for sociologists and military historians interested in Southeast Asia....Written for academics but not oppressively dry, the book is well organized and has an excellent bibliography and an adequate index." **SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story of the Soviet Special Forces** by Viktor Suvorov,

New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987, 213 pages, \$17.95. "If and until Suvorov can write using objectively verifiable historical facts, his books should not be read. This is especially so where he writes of Soviet *SPETSNAZ*, about which he apparently knows next to nothing."

**Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of Soviet Military Development** by James H. Hansen, N.Y.: Praeger, 1987, 236 pages, \$37.95. "My advice to military readers is that they should not buy this book and that they should discourage their libraries from buying it as well. Although Mr. Hansen is an expert, his book is not worth reading."

All of the following books are from Westview Press, Boulder, Colo. **The Soviet Union and Iran: Soviet Policy in Iran from the Beginnings of the Pahlavi Dynasty Until the Soviet Invasion in 1941** by Miron Rezun, 1988, 425 pages. **The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic** by Mohsen M. Milani, 316 pages. **Iran and Iraq at War** by Shahram Chub and Charles Tripp, 1988, 318 pages. **The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities** by Anthony H. Cordesman, 1988, 526 pages. "Unfortunately, all of these books were written before the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the attendant and subsequent government crises in Iran, and so though, none of them give any odds on success. There is too much about the internals of the Soviet Union that is unknown,

nonetheless, worthwhile reading for those seeking an intimate understanding in these areas."

**Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy** by D. Michael Shafer, Princeton N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988, 331 pages, \$34.50 (\$12.95 paperback). "The book is too esoteric for practitioners and does not deserve a place in the libraries of special operations and intelligence personnel."

**Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries** by Edward E. Rice, Berkeley, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 1988, 186 pages, \$18.95. "Overall this book is good reading for strategic intelligence analysts and special operations forces involved in Third World conflicts. It is well-researched, readable and has good historical anecdotes. It is a good thought piece for policy makers and ought to be read by the architects of President Bush's emergent Latin American, African and Middle Eastern Policies."

I would like to bring a recent publication to your attention. This is an annotated bibliography of Soviet special purpose forces (*SPETSNAZ*) across the whole spectrum of Soviet experience. Order by written request to Commander, CAC, ATZL-SAS (Major Gebhardt), Fort Leavenworth, Kan. 66027-5015, or call AV 552-4434/4333 or com. 913-684-4434/4333. I want to point out that all of the sources are listed in either Russian or German.

# IT'S YOUR CAREER

MI officers may apply for Advanced Civilian Schooling (ACS) in accordance with Army Regulation 621-1, for degrees in the following areas: Electronic Warfare Systems Technology, Space Communications Systems, Physics, Electronic Engineering, Artificial Intelligence or Computer Science. Hard science and technical degrees are being encouraged and supported. ACS applications are due to MI Branch by October 5, 1990, with a projected board date on or about October 16, 1990.

The Junior Officer Cryptologic Career Program (JOCCP) accepts approximately four applicants into the program each year. A message explaining criteria and application procedures will be released by MI Branch. Applications are due to MI Branch October 19, 1990, with a projected board date of October 30, 1990.

It is an officer's responsibility to ensure that their Officer Record Brief (ORB) is kept accurate. The majority of the form must have corrections input at the Personnel Service Company level. MI Branch has very little control over major portions of the ORB. It is for this reason that officers **must** input data to their PSCs and follow up on these actions. The correct mailing address on your ORB is critical to MI Branch to ensure we can reach you at any time. Height and weight data is extremely important as this is one of the key focus areas for a promotion board. Duty titles are done at the PSC level! Ensure that your duty titles accurately reflect what your job is, not just a generic title such as Tactical Intelligence Officer if you are really the battalion S2. Also, don't

use an acronym that is not easily identified.

There are various promotion boards coming up. The following is a projected schedule:

COL, Army April 3-27, 1990

CSC, Army May 1-15, 1990

LTC, Army June 6-12, 1990

SSC, Army August 14-September 14, 1990

MAJ, Army September 5-October 19, 1990

We will continually try to publish some of the most asked questions that we receive.

**Q:** When and how will I receive my follow-on assignment after the Advanced Course?

**A:** MIOAC students will not receive their follow-on assignments **until they are actually in the common core phase of MIOAC**. The best way to influence your assignment is to ensure that your latest preference statement is in your file prior to the start date of this course. Available assignments are not even known by the assignments officer until approximately two weeks prior to the TDY trip to Fort Huachuca. Due to this fact, we will be unable to help you with your follow-on assignment until that time.

**Q:** How can I influence what Area of Concentration I'll receive?

**A:** You can notify us of what AOC course you would like to attend and MI Branch will attempt to get a seat in that particular class. Once you receive your Request for Orders (RFO) you can only change your Track course upon arrival at Fort Huachuca.

**Q:** What are the dates of any upcoming MIOTC/MIOAC courses?

RPT DATE	START DATE	END DATE	CLASS #	RPT DATE	START DATE	END DATE	RPT DATE	START DATE	END DATE
							12 Apr 90	13 Apr 90	29 Jun 90
			90-03	29 Apr 90	2 May 90	5 Jul 90	5 Jul 91	6 Jul 90	21 Sep 90
3 May 90	7 May 90	6 Jul 90	90-04	11 Jul 90	16 Jul 90	17 Sep 90	17 Sep 90	18 Sep 90	6 Dec 90
15 Jul 90	23 Jul 90	20 Sep 90	90-05	25 Sep 90	28 Sep 90	14 Nov 90	14 Nov 90	15 Nov 90	11 Mar 91
11 Sep 90	12 Sep 90	14 Nov 90	91-01	14 Nov 90	19 Nov 90	24 Jan 91	24 Jan 91	25 Jan 91	26 Apr 91
1 Nov 90	2 Nov 90	23 Jan 91	91-02	23 Jan 91	28 Jan 91	18 Mar 91	18 Mar 91	19 Mar 91	21 Jun 91
8 Jan 91	9 Jan 91	13 Mar 91	91-03	15 Mar 91	20 Mar 91	7 May 91	7 May 91	8 May 91	14 Aug 91
28 Feb 91	1 Mar 91	1 May 91	91-04	7 May 91	10 May 91	1 Jul 91	1 Jul 91	2 Jul 91	9 Oct 91
2 May 91	3 May 91	3 Jul 91	91-05	7 Jul 91	10 Jul 91	28 Aug 91			
24 Jul 91	25 Jul 91	25 Sep 91	FY 92 Schedule TBD						



by Colonel Joseph T. Mesch

Beginning with this issue, Total Force becomes a regular **MI Professional Bulletin** feature. The Reserve Forces Office from both Fort Devens and Fort Huachuca will present current news and items of importance to the MI community. The theme of this section is "options." In brief, the varied opportunities available to you serving as an intelligence soldier in the Army Reserve and National Guard.

### **Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA)**

Intelligence soldiers transitioning from Active Duty to the Reserve Component are not always able to find a matched slot in a troop unit. If that happens, here's how you can still serve in your MOS and be part of the Selected Reserve.

Join the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) ranks. This Active Component program provides staff augmentation during mobilization with trained and identified Reserve soldiers.

Here is an example. The Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca and Fort Devens has identified 115 IMA slots for fill in FY 91. The School works with Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) in St. Louis, Mo. to keep these slots filled and follows with a solid annual two week training program.

We try to recruit from a geographic area within a reasonable distance. But if you plan on living in another part of the country, don't despair. Out of some 18,800 IMA slots, over 2,000 are MI. Opportunities to serve include locations such as Fort Lewis, Fort Bragg, at Department of the Army or with national intelligence agencies such as Defense Intelligence Agency and Army Intelli-

gence Agency. So, MI soldiers, here's another option for you to keep serving. Soldiers should contact their In-Service Recruiter or call toll free to ARPERCEN (800-325-4119 for officers and 800-325-4715 for enlisted).

### **MI Linguist Units**

The fastest growing structure in the MI Total Force are the MI language units. These units have a long tradition in the National Guard. In fact, the 142d MI Battalion (Ling) from Utah will celebrate its 30th anniversary in 1990. The structure has grown from a single company to a brigade, the 300th MI Brigade (Ling). In addition to brigade headquarters, there are six Guard battalions throughout CONUS and one separate Reserve company in Hawaii.

The 300th conducts over 250 missions each year. These involve linguist support for all levels of the Army. Soldiers in these intelligence units serve as interrogators, on treaty verification, for drug interdiction, and provide host-nation support at Army exercises.

These language units are growing. The Army has programmed additional battalions in the next few years. If you're transitioning from active duty and want to maintain your language skills, see your In-Service Recruiter or call the full timers at the 300th in Salt Lake City (AV 924-5207 or commercial 801 524-5207).

### **Reserve Force Advisors**

At Fort Huachuca, Colonel Joe Mesch (AV 821-1176 or commercial 602 533-1176) and at Fort Devens, Lieutenant Colonel John Craig (AV 256-3403 or commercial 508 776-3403) are available to help you and provide guidance.

# CAS<sup>3</sup>

Any Year Group 81 officer who has not yet completed the nine-week Phase II of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS<sup>3</sup>) at Fort Leavenworth must do so by the end of FY90. Failure to attend may jeopardize promotion and staff college selection. FY90 classes are also open to captains in Year Group 82 and later who have completed the advanced course and Phase I of CAS<sup>3</sup>. For report dates refer to the Army Training Requirement and Resource System computer network, or call the CAS<sup>3</sup> Operations Office at AV 552-2113 or 2602. Other questions can be directed to the senior Military Intelligence representative on the CAS<sup>3</sup> faculty, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Loendorf, at AV 552-2639/5257, extension 24.

Captains must report to the Fort Leavenworth billeting office in Hoge Barracks by 1200 on their report date, one day before the class start date. They must bring a copy of their CAS<sup>3</sup> Phase I completion certificate. The School of Correspond-

ing Studies no longer accepts hand-delivered Phase I material for scoring. Captains reporting for Phase II without a Phase I completion certificate in their possession will not be enrolled.

The Combined Arms Center Commander and Command and General Staff College Commandant has initiated two changes which impact on your planning for CAS<sup>3</sup> completion. First, enrollment in Phase I is now automatic upon graduation from the advanced course. Captains have two years following advanced course graduation to complete Phase I, the nonresident phase. Second, CAS<sup>3</sup> graduation is a prerequisite to enrolling in the CGSOC nonresident course. Watch for these and other changes in DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization*, as mandatory CAS<sup>3</sup> attendance becomes institutionalized in the officer professional development and selection policies.

## Need a Manual? Read AR 25-30!

We have a little problem. At the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School we receive many requests for DA publications that are readily available through the Standard Army Publication System (STARPUBS) or, as it is commonly called — initial distribution. Almost always your reason for requesting the manual from us is that the initial distribution system doesn't work. However, we obtain all the manuals we use here at the school through that same STARPUBS system.

The system works for the school because we make it work, and you can make it work for you too. All you have to do is take a personal interest. Use the same enthusiasm when ordering the doctrine your unit needs to function as you do when requisitioning equipment, personnel and other materials you need to execute your mission.

Get familiar with AR 25-30, *The Army Publishing and Printing Program* and you're on track with STARPUBS. AR 25-30 tells you how to establish and maintain a publications account for your unit. It contains specific instructions on how to get manuals as they are produced or changed, and how to get manuals to replace those you've worn out or lost.

But you already knew that. So what can the school provide in the publications line? Well, the school is the place where the manuals are written. We can provide draft copies of the manuals we are currently working on. But once the manual is approved and published for Army-wide distribution, it must be obtained through STARPUBS. That's where AR 25-30 comes into use.

Chapter 12 of AR 25-30 covers distribution of published manuals. Section II is called Initial Distribution and paragraph 12-7 is Establishing Initial Distribution. It tells you who is authorized a publications account, how to get one and most important of all, how to keep your publications account current.

That's OK, you say, for the unclassified manuals, but what about the classified material I need to complete my mission? Paragraph 12-9 of AR 25-30 gives you a step by step process for establishing and maintaining a classified account. As new or updated classified manuals are published, your unit will get the material and you won't have to do anything but sign the receipt. No more

(Continued on page 52)



# VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION QUIZ


**FRIEND OR FOE?** This is a quiz to test your ability to identify friendly and threat vehicles. This is a skill all enlisted soldiers are tested on yearly in their Common Task Test. It is also a

skill critical for everyone on a modern battlefield. New vehicles are constantly entering the inventories, while Third World countries use older or modified equipment. How good are you at keeping current?


Vehicles are correctly identified on page 52 with identifying features listed.




1



3



2



4

# CRYPTO XBLVAN

by Chief Warrant Officer Two Leroy Engle

The digraph ZI, which appears six times could be RE, ER, ST and TH. If we try TH first, we look at the three occurrences of ZITOK which could be THEIR. If that is the case, then we can put these into the second clue KTYTK, where we end up with RE\_ER. So, now we can assume that KTYTK is REFER.

The final solution is: **WHEN WE REFER TO OUR NCOs BY THEIR PAY GRADE RATHER THAN THEIR RANK, WE SUBVERT THEIR POWER AND AUTHORITY.**

Probably, one of the happiest experiences I've had was shortly after publication of this substitution system when DA sent a message reaffirming the plain text. Did they break our cipher system?

(Continued from page 50)

scrounging to get a copy of a manual when a short fused deployment stares you in the face.

So come on, commander, get AR 25-30 and spend 15 minutes to become familiar with Chapter 12. It may be the most productive 15 minutes of your career.

(Answers to Vehicle Identification Quiz page 51)

## 1 T-72M

- Rounded turret
- Bore evacuator 1/3 from end of muzzle, sectional bolt-on thermal sleeve
- Round IR searchlight mounted low and right of gun
- Boxed snorkel mounted on left-rear of turret
- Smoke grenade launchers (seven on left side, five on right side) of turret
- Sharply sloped glacis with V-shaped splash guard
- Fuel cells in right fender, storage in left fender

## 2 ENGESA EE-T1 (Brazil)

- Angular, boxy turret
- Main gun encased in stepped, thermal sleeve (no evacuator)
- Secondary armament (HB Cal. 50) mounted top-left of turret

# CORNER XNBSJB

Another piece of good news — I finished reading Field Manual 34-40-2 and sent it to Major General Menoher for final approval and publication. Our other half at Fort Devens did a superb job on this Field Manual. I can't wait for you smart guys to join us at Fort Huachuca.

This issue's cryptogram is one of the systems you have seen in previous issues of *MI Magazine*. There are no clues and no hints, other than it may help to do a uniliteral frequency distribution to get into the system. Good luck!

TLTRR TTHSO SYEAE KRTPC NAIFR THGDL

OAANO DLRIN INIIS NAQIT NOELU NIDLD

YEEOI DITSX NCINI IXAAE CCSXX

If you have any questions you think we might be able to answer, call us.

Neal Griffin  
Doctrine and Publications Division  
AV 879-2676/3266 or commercial 601-538  
2676/3266

Large protruding optics boxes top-right of turret

Six smoke grenade launchers each rear-side of turret

Wavy, full skirts

## 3 TYPE 88 (Republic of Korea)

- Flat, low-silhouette angular turret
- Bore evacuator near turret end of gun
- Secondary armament (Coaxial M-60, commander's M-2 cal. 50, loader's M-60)
- Six smoke grenade launchers each side of turret front


Commander's panoramic sight on right side of turret

Flat, boxy hull

## 4 M1A1 ABRAMS (United States)

- Large flat, angular turret
- Large bore evacuator near turret end of gun
- Secondary armament (Coaxial M-60, commander's M-2 cal. 50, loader's M-60)
- Large, flat boxy hull

# 524th Military Intelligence Battalion



*Azure (oriental blue) and silver gray are the colors associated with Military Intelligence. The interlocking chevrons suggest the gathering of information from many sources processed through the unit and distributed throughout the Army, as represented by the border. The black pellets suggest the unit's ability to interpret various data and to form assessments of military situations. Eighteen refers to the number of campaigns in which the unit participated in Korea and Vietnam.*

The 524th MI Battalion was consituted on September 25, 1950 in the Regular Army as the 524th Technical Intelligence Coordinator Detachment. It was activated on October 10, 1950 at Fort Riley, Kan. On June 22, 1965, it was redesignated as the 524th Intelligence Corps Detachment and reactivated in July 1965 at Fort Bragg, N.C. The detachment was redesignated again in October 1966 as the 524th MI Detachment and inactivated in November 1970 in Vietnam. In June 1982 is was redesignated as the 524th MI Battalion and activated in Korea.

During the Korean War the unit participated in the CCF intervention, the first U.N. counteroffensive, the CCF spring offensive, the U.N. summer-fall offensive, and the second Korean winter. In Vietnam the unit was involved in the phase II, III, IV, V, VI and VII counteroffensives, the Tet offensive and the sanctuary counteroffensive.

Commander

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